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Introduction
Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1672) was a rationalist philosopher which in his main work, the Ethics, used 
a  geometrical  method to  show that  we  can  arrive  at  truths  about  the  world  following postulated 
definitions, axioms and propositions. Spinoza held that from his propositions, substance monism and 
parallelism of mind and body would follow as something logical necessary, and that the implications of 
that  in turn had importance  for  ethics and practical philosophy.  Spinoza  rejected  any notion of  an 
anthropomorphic God, and identified God with Nature: Deus sive Natura. In nature, causes and effects 
are necessary, and this is an important cornerstone in Spinoza's universe; since everything according to 
Spinoza is part of, or follows from, a necessary causal chain, everything is in a way necessary.
Necessarianism is stronger than determinism (even in its strictest  form), because a strict  determinist 
would allow that the causal chains constituting the world  could have been different  as a whole, even 
though each member of the chain could not have been different, given its antecedent causes.
Whether Spinoza is seen as a necessitarian or a determinist will bring about important implications for 
how we interpret  and understand his ethical project  as  a  whole.  There are  reasons to  believe that 
Spinoza is to be seen as a necessetarian. Understanding Spinoza's modal metaphysics, i.e. his basic ideas 
and metaphysical framework regarding necessity and possibility, is crucial to  later on be able to  say 
something about what this means for his ethical project, morality, agency and prospects of living well. 
Given the rigid framework of ontological necessity and the unquestionable rejection of free will we are 
presented with in the  Ethics  from first part and onwards, several questions are raised. The text more 
than just implies that we are not agents in the traditional sense; given that everything is necessary and 
nothing is contingent (EIp29), our common understanding of being free agents are put to the test. Even 
if we accept the premise of necessity, does it have to mean the end for concepts like voluntary actions, 
responsibility, intentionality and autonomy, concepts that often define how we understand free agency? 
Spinoza ties the subject of determinism up to mental causality and defends the position of parallelism. 
His idea is that the physical is determined, the mental is determined, and thus he postulates a sort of one-
to-one correlation between mental and physical items. Everything physical has a correlating ''mental 
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idea''. The mental sphere that is determined parallels the determined physical sphere.
This master’s thesis will also deal with questions regarding Spinoza’s views on determinism and mental 
causality. Mental causality regards the idea that the mental acts causally upon the physical world and 
whether it can be cause for human agency.  How we understand ''the mental'' (and also ''the physical'') in 
this context is important. Whether it is seen as a set of properties, events or a vocabulary, it's associated  
with intentionality, feelings and qualia, but is also closely related to how we think of morality. It is many 
people’s clear intuition that the moment the notion of mentality is threatened, free will, responsibility, 
and thus morality is immediately in a position under pressure. In many ways it may seem like the old 
question of free will versus determinism. I will argue that, following Spinoza, we should and can allow 
room for  responsibility and morality –  concepts  often related  to  freedom – even in our  defending 
determinism.  True  Freedom is in fact  one  of  Spinoza’s  main goals.  This  means I  will discuss  the  
compatibilism in Spinoza's thoughts, and show how he defines true freedom as something compatible 
with determinism and necessity.
I'll argue that despite Spinoza’s  strict determined world view,  human agency (which is often seen as 
standing in discrepancy to Spinoza’s necessitarianism) is different from what it would have been when 
postulating radical  freedom of  the will,  but  still not  at  all so restricted (or  eliminated)  in Spinoza's 
thought as one may think. We can rather postulate a sort of self-determinism, and I will consider and 
conclude  that  a  natural  consequence  of  this  rejection  of  free  will  is  not  any amoral  mayhem,  or  
cancellation of responsibility for ones actions. Rather it contributes to the formation of a (moral) self-
identity where one understands that our minds with its thoughts and ideas are causally necessary, and 
can be acted upon like any other cause and effect. Several reflections is thus involved in this. As I will 
show, we need to be aware of questions like ‘What is my nature?’, ‘What does my nature strive for’, and 
this can, in turn,  answer questions of goals in life (or if there are any, given Spinoza’s rejection of 
teleology), of the related meaning in life, and of what we ought to do. Spinoza was influenced by the 
scholastics and it has an undeniable Aristotelian association to it. Arête is the virtue of functioning in the 
best possible manner in tune with one’s nature; and, likewise, to live at best as human being can be seen 
directly connected to the goal of the Ethics. God's essence is to be cause of itself, and it is in its nature 
to be its own nature completely. The human essence is in a way to strive for the same thing. What are  
the goal and the meaning when we strive towards being most fully our nature? Are there any oughts, or 
is it just is?
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Chapter One – Spinoza's Modal Metaphysics
What are Spinoza's ontological views on necessity and possibility, and why should we concern ourselves 
with  the  intricate  details  of  the  matter?  For  a  better  and  more  accurate  understanding  of  the 
interpretative landscape, and to be able to display a hopefully fruitful and coherent thesis, it is of vital 
importance not only to deliver a brief overview, but to study in depth this sometimes rather entangled 
jungle of definitions, propositions and axioms which constitute the make-up of The Ethics.  Figuratively 
built, rock upon rock, like a pyramid, the modal metaphysics can be seen as the foundation necessary to 
reach the top of the ethical endpoint with the goals of human joy, freedom and bliss. Spinoza wrote in a 
letter to Henry Oldenburg (Ep.75) how his modality was 'the principal basis of all the contents of the 
treatise'. It is thus a natural place to start the investigating, to explore the connections to several other 
aspects of his philosophy and, naturally to reveal problematic features.  
I first want to draw a few preliminary sketches of what I will focus on in this chapter. Before I can, as  
promised,  explore  the  connections  between Spinoza’s  modal metaphysics  and his ethical project,  a 
thorough analysis of what lies in the concept of ''modal metaphysics'' is needed. This is the topic of §1. 
And likewise I will carefully investigate Spinoza's views on necessity and possibility and some important 
conclusions  he  deduced  from  it  in  §2.  The  next  section,  §3,  is  dedicated  to  the  interpretative 
disagreements in Spinozistic scholarship about exactly what Spinoza's modal commitments really are. 
Lastly, I will conclude and summarize in §4, hopefully with a valid argument for my standpoint and 
therefore setting the stage for the next chapter with my conclusion.
§1.  What is ''Modal Metaphysics”?
Every day we employ modal notions such as  possible,  impossible,  necessary and  contingent on the 
world. Modal metaphysics is the theories about the ontological status of these concepts and how to 
apply them meaningfully and truthfully. What exists ontologically, and what sorts of implications follow 
if we, for example, accept possible worlds? Or, is this the only possible world? What is the relation 
between a thing; its  essential and its  accidental properties,  if we even are capable of  making such 
distinctions? 
I will not pretend to give clear answers to these complex questions within the limits of this thesis, but I 
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wish to illuminate them. To put it all in context, I will give my account with special attention towards 
two  philosophers  regarded  as  closely  related  to  Spinoza,  namely  Descartes  and  Leibniz.  The 
interpretation of Descartes and Leibniz on modality has difficulties of its own that I do not wish to get  
too deeply involved in here. For present purposes it will suffice to present a plausible reading of a few 
highlights in their texts on the related topic. 
Descartes on Modality 
Spinoza's precursor Descartes' ideas on modal metaphysics are not very elaborate. With his mind-body 
dualism and advocacy of the free will, his doctrine that the world is created by God's free will differs 
clearly  from  Spinoza's  and  offers  several  questions.  We'll  see  that  their  respective  ontological 
understanding of God plays a role in how they see modality.
Despite the fact that it is hard to grasp what Descartes’ modal commitments really are, due to some 
unclarity  and  inconsistency  in  his  writings  on  the  subject,  the  well-known  philosophical  method 
Descartes applies in  Meditations on First  Philosophy addresses modal metaphysical notions.  In the 
meditations he entertains a number of metaphysical claims and possibilities, but later suggests that even 
though some of them seem necessary and evident to us, we might still be mistaken about their truth-
value. This applies also to our own existence. One of Descartes’ famous suggestions is the one that it 
might be possible that a malevolent demon constantly deceives us. Descartes concludes that it is an 
eternal and necessary truth that God is no evil deceiver. How does he reach this conclusion?
It  depends  on  his  ontological  understanding  of  God.  The  argument  is  that  God  has  all  sorts  of 
perfections and no imperfections. But deceiving is an imperfection. Descartes writes at the end of the 
third meditation, Of God, and that there is a God:
[…] God... Having all those perfections, which I cannot comprehend... and who is not subject to any Defects. By 
which 'tis evident that  God  is no  Deceiver,  for 'tis manifest by the  Light  of  Nature,  that all  fraud  and  deceit  
depends on some defect.1
Descartes holds that  when doing metaphysics we ought  to  speak only of the things we clearly and 
distinctly perceive. He argues that God necessarily exists because he has a clear idea of a being most  
perfect,  i.e.,  of God, and therefore,  he says, it evidently follows that  there is a God. 2 This form of 
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argumentation can obviously be subjected to criticism, as Kant's objection in Critique of Pure Reason 
shows.  Kant  questions  the  intelligibility  of  the  concept  of  a  necessary,  infinitely perfect  being  by 
considering examples of necessary propositions. A triangle necessarily has three angles, if it exists. If X 
exists, it necessarily exists with three angles. It does not mean that X necessarily exists. A contradiction 
will only emerge when the predicate ''existence'' is necessarily contained in the concept. But ''existence'' 
is not a predicate according to Kant. 
But Descartes did not have Kant's objection at hand, and his point is that God is a being, which exists  
necessarily. For Descartes there is possible existence (possibilities that are not necessary actualized) and 
necessary existence (possibilities that must be actualized). The will and decree of God constitutes and 
actualizes the eternal and necessary truths. This is a point in which he differentiates from Spinoza and I  
will return to  Spinoza’s objection in §2,  but in short,  Descartes' problem is annihilated in Spinoza's  
system. God is in Spinoza's view not ''slave to logic'', he is logic. 
In the meantime, let’s turn to the author of the Fifth Objections, Pierre Gassendi, and his demur: The 
view that God can, upon will, do anything is problematic because then nothing is really immutable. This 
includes the eternal and necessary truths. They were created by God by His free will but for something 
to be eternally necessary it cannot be the case that it could be otherwise, even if God so chose. The 
divine omnipotence Descartes insists upon commits him to accept the possibility that the eternal and 
necessary truths not are so eternal and necessary after all.
We stand here before a problematic incoherency:
(p1)  Eternal and necessary truths exist.
(p2)  God is free to create and change things at His own will.
(p3)  God could have created the eternal and necessary truths otherwise if he would.
If we are to understand ''eternal and necessary'' as we commonly do today, it is obvious that something 
has to give. It is puzzling how eternal truths can be necessary if they were produced by a free act of  
God. Descartes chose to  keep God’s divine omnipotence and to  ease up on the necessity of eternal 
truths. The interpretation suggests that the eternal truths are contingent because they could have been 
false  given  God’s  willing  it  so.  This  means  that  not  even  mathematical  truths  are  necessary  or 
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unchangeable in themselves. Descartes writes: ''It will be said that if God has established these truths He 
could change them as a  king changes his laws.  To  this the answer is: Yes He can,  if His will can  
change.''3
Lilli Alanen comments that: 
We understand these truths as eternal and unchangeable because we understand God as immutable and eternal.  
But they are not  immutable because of any intrinsic  necessity.  Because they are freely established by God,  
they could  be  other  than  they are.  To  say that  the  laws  determining  all  the  motions  in  the  universe  are  
independent  of  God’s  will,  would  indeed  be  to  subject  God  ''to  the  Styx  and  the  Fates,''  committing  
Descartes to a necessitarianism of the kind Spinoza eventually advocated,  and which he was obviously very  
keen to avoid.4
I find the last sentence in this quote a bit imprecise and unfair to Spinoza. True, Descartes did not want 
to restrict God’s divine freedom, and Spinoza applies a different concept of divine necessity here, but to  
say  that  Spinoza  thereby  took  the  direction  of  subjecting  God  to  the  Styx  and  the  fates  is  a 
misunderstanding.  In  short,  Spinoza  agrees  with  this  denial,  but  he  could  not  accept  the 
anthropomorphic  Cartesian  alternative.  For  a  further  discussion  on  this,  see  Curley's  postscript  in 
Spinoza's Metaphysics.5 It seems however, to  be a common misunderstanding, and not a trivial one, 
because it is one Spinoza seemed particularly keen to set straight (see §2 below). However, it was not 
unreasonable of Descartes to hesitate embracing necessetarianism. The comparison to a king who can 
change his laws might not be the best one, and gives associations to human whims and inconsistencies. 
I'm sure this was not Descartes' intent, and subsequently he also adds if his will can change, suggesting 
Gods consistency and immutability, not being susceptible to change. But still, as Alanen points out, this 
is not an intrinsic necessary aspect. Not of the world and not of God. God’s will is thought by Descartes 
to be perfect and therefore needs not change, but if He would, He could.  
Leibniz on Modality 
Leibniz's Modal Metaphysics can be seen as a reaction to the necessitarianism of Spinoza (and Hobbes). 
Leibniz operated with the concept of individual substance, and each individual substance has a complete 
individual  concept  (CIC).  This  contains  all  true  predicates  of  the  individual  substance,  from past, 
present and future. When we consider the CIC as constituting each individual substance's essence, it 
follows from this that no two substances can be qualitatively identical and differ numerically. This is 
quite a leap from Spinoza’s one-substance-thesis, but Leibniz was no less of an explanatory rationalist 
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than Spinoza was.6 Leibniz called it The Principle of Sufficient Reason, and asks several questions: 
The first question we are entitled to ask will be why is there something rather than nothing?...Moreover, even  
if we assume that things have to exist, we must be able to give a reason why they have to exist as they are and 
not otherwise.7
Like Descartes, Leibniz finds his answer in God. As extramundane or transcendent, He is the ultimate 
reason for things. Our world is the actual one because God chose to actualize it, and the reason is that  
the actual world is the best possible world. Mocked by Voltaire in the 1759 satire Candide, the tenet of 
the philosopher and tutor Pangloss that ''all happens for the best in the best of all possible worlds'' is a 
reference to the Leibnizian view. Pangloss maintained his optimistic belief that this world is the best of 
all possible worlds even after having encountered great sufferings. So how does Leibniz defend that this 
world is necessary, and necessarily the best of all possible worlds?
According to Leibniz a world is made up by a set of composite, finite things, individual substances and 
certain  laws  of  nature.  This  composition  of  things  is  something  God  can  chose  to  actualize  into  
existence. (Leibniz endorsed the a priori-argument for God’s existence like Descartes and Spinoza. That 
there is a God and that He is absolute perfection are unconditionally necessary for Leibniz, and for him 
self-explanatory8. I will not get involved with ontological  proofs or scrutinize this particular problem 
here,  but  I  will return to  the  subject  in the  next  paragraph on Spinoza.  With respect  to  this  brief 
exposition of Leibniz's argumentation I suggest we for now accept the postulate.) However, the fact that 
Leibniz sees God as extramundane and His existence and nature as necessary excludes them from the 
contingent facts in the worlds. God can choose freely which world and particular composition of things 
He wishes to realize. Leibniz pursues possible things and contingency because it shows the freedom of 
God. He rejects that God simply creates; God can see all possible outcomes in all possible worlds and 
actualizes in creation the best out of all the possibilities out of his goodness. However, not even God can 
bring into existence something contradictory. If the laws of gravity in world W* dictate that while one 
stands in the middle of Avenue des Champs-Élysées and drops a one pound brick it falls down, in the 
same world W* it cannot be the case that under the same circumstances the brick would fly upwards, or  
that there were no  Avenue des Champs-Élysées or France. The latter would be properties of another 
possible world, say W**. Like in Descartes, we see that Leibniz holds that God could create a different  
world (''change His laws'') if He would. 
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This brief review of how Descartes and Leibniz thought about modality show that they both stressed the 
transcendent  God's omnipotence,  perfection,  goodness and divine will.  God becomes thus the most 
important explanatory factor regarding how the world has come to be, and why it became as it is. God 
exists with the utmost necessity, but His creations, natural laws and finite being does not. Spinoza also 
states the necessary existence of God, or Nature, but the extension of what follows will differ.  
Descartes viewed possible and existing things as something understood and created by God. All that is 
understood  by  God  is  necessary  existence.  Also  possible  non-existing  things  subjected  to  our 
imaginations are still 'existing' in the mental sphere, i.e. in the soul, if not the physical. Whereas Leibniz, 
as we have seen, made a distinction between God’s understanding and will. God understands all the 
possible worlds, but will only create the actual one with all its appropriate components. 
§2.  Do Spinoza's modal views commit him to necessitarianism?
Necessitarianism requires an  exceptionless commitment to  the absolute necessity of all things. Being 
sensitive  to  the  whole  of  Spinoza's  metaphysical  system we need  to  be  sensitive  towards  how he 
allocates necessity and possibility. Spinoza is rigorously deterministic throughout his texts. The being of 
all things is determined by the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in certain ways (EIp29) and 
things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than they have been 
(EIp33). As with Descartes and Leibniz, the assumption of God is ever-present. However, we shall see 
that Spinoza's derivate is far from the former two. Spinoza's Ethics is notoriously challenging in how it 
constantly throws the reader back and forth. But the first book, De Deo, ''Concerning God'' is where he 
expounded the intricacy of his principal ideas, which the rest of the parts in the Ethics build upon. It is 
hence the most natural place to start our analysis.
In this section I will give an account for how Spinoza explains and defends the necessity of the  one 
substance, how he identifies this one substance with God/or Nature and how all things flow from this 
with necessity. I will defend the view that Spinoza can be seen as a moderate necessitarian, as opposed 
to the strict necessitarian interpretation. Out of this it will be clear how Spinoza's God differs from the 
claim about being subjected to ''the Styx and the Fates'' like Descartes feared, as well as from acting with 
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deliberate consideration and pick what He chooses among several possibilities like Leibniz held. 
During the  explication  of  Spinoza's  argumentation,  the  significant  and inseparable relation between 
substance monism, necessity, self-determinism and ethics will emerge. 
The cornerstones in Spinoza's ontological proof of God are in mainlines drawn from the propositions of 
EIp1 to  EIp15. Before the propositions he offers six principal definitions, on (1) that  which is self-
caused, (2) finite things, (3) substance, (4) attributes, (5) modes, and (6) God. 
A substance is defined as
..that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the 
conception of another thing from which it has to be formed.
 His definition of God is stated as follows:
By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that  is,  substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence.  Explication: I say ‘absolutely infinite’, not ‘infinite in its kind’. For if a  
thing is only infinite in its kind, one may deny that it has infinite attributes. But if a thing is absolutely infinite,  
whatever expresses essence and does not involve any negation belongs to its essence
Further, his definition of attribute is 'that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its 
essence'. The attributes are the essential expression of the substance, constituting how we perceive its 
nature. When Spinoza says that God is a substance containing infinite attributes, I identify infinite with 
''all possible''. Of all possible attributes, we are familiar with two: thought and extension.
Spinoza’s argumentation for God as the infinite, self-caused, necessary existing one substance is based 
on the assumptions that there must be (I) one substance with all possible attributes, and that (II) no two 
substances can share the same nature or attribute: 
(EIp5) In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute. 
He then goes forth claiming that there is one substance, God, with infinite attributes in EIp11: 
11
God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, 
necessarily exists. 
He thus concludes in EIp14, that  
There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God. 
If another substance existed it would have to have some or another attribute or essence, but Spinoza has 
strictly stated that two substances cannot share attributes, and God already holds all possible attributes.  
More  than one  substance  is considered  by Spinoza  to  be absurd.  This line of  argument  should be 
examined closer, because it is in no way unproblematic. 
The argumentation for Spinoza’s monism
It is important for Spinoza's ethical project to establish his substance monism. This is also especially 
important for his parallelism-doctrine, as I will show below in the next chapter. However, getting there 
requires  thorough  understanding  of  the  argumentation.  Unfortunately,  Spinoza's  propositions  and 
arguments are frequently far from being as clear and straightforward as he might have intended. For 
example, why is it that two substances cannot share attributes? Leibniz suggested that two substances 
might share some attributes and have some distinct. One substance, A, could have the attributes x and y, 
whilst substance B could have the attributes y and z.9 And why could not A and B be numerically distinct 
even though they have the same attribute? Probably, at the point of EIp5 in his argument for monism, 
Spinoza is considering a Cartesian framework, i.e. he is considering substances with only one attribute. 
If the attributes were considered identical, then it would be an application of what Leibniz later called 
the identity of indiscernibles, i.e. if the attributes constituting the substances are identical, there could be 
no basis for distinguishing the substances. This might hold for EIp5, but Spinoza appeals to the same 
logic in EIp14, where it applies to God, the one substance of infinite attributes. To save the argument, 
we must first shed light on the no shared attribute-thesis, and then show that the interpretation cannot be 
limited to substances with one attribute. 
As already mentioned above, Spinoza's understanding of attribute is that which the intellect perceives of  
substance as constituting its essence. The question of the identity-conditions of the attributes, i.e. what 
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it might mean to claim that two attributes belonging to two distinct substances are identical is important  
for sufficient understanding. Having in mind that for Spinoza attributes express the essence, or nature, of 
substance allows him to claim that each attribute is substance considered from a certain point of view or 
taken under a certain  description, which, in turn, explains why he sometimes identifies substance and 
attribute.10  However, this contradicts the objection that two substances might both have attribute x and 
still not express the same nature and essence. Say that x is thought, for example. Should not both A and 
B be able to possess x without it being claimed they are identical? Granted, it is unlikely that A and B's 
thoughts are identical, and thus we can say they differ with respect to their different thoughts (affections 
or  states).  This,  however,  allows a plurality of substances with the same attribute.  We could argue 
against that by saying that, if the affections are put to the side and substance is considered in itself, one 
cannot  be  conceived from another. But why should  we put  the  affections  or  states  aside? This  is 
puzzling. Allison follows Russell in his interpretation11, which says that,  on the assumption currently  
under consideration, the substances must be indistinguishable prior to the assignment of predicates  
(affections). I understand this as follows: if we assume, like Spinoza does, that substance A's attribute x,  
(with affection we can read it as x*) and substance B's attribute x, (or x**) are indistinguishable prior to 
the assignments of predicates (affections), the only way to mark them as distinct substances is to assume 
that they are numerically distinct to begin with. Clearly, x* = x** is not true, whereas x = x is. We can 
allow setting the affections aside because predicates are  not  a sufficient  basis for distinction,  and a 
substance is prior in nature to its states (EIp1). Thought can be affected in many ways, but it is still an 
attribute belonging to, and expressing substance; and if we were to claim several substances with the 
attribute of thought, they would be identical and thus one.
The problems of EIp5 could be discussed in detail. But I will not dig deeper into this particular problem 
for  now,  having showed in the  most  important  lines  how Spinoza  denies the possibility of  several 
substances sharing attributes12. 
Spinoza further needs to exclude the possibility of several substances with different attributes. This is 
important  for  him,  not  only in the  rejection  of  Cartesian  mind-body-dualism,  where  extended  and 
thinking substance share nothing except their dependence on God, but it is thereby also an important 
step  in  his  criticism of  the  Judeo-Christian-Islamic  conception  of  God  and  created  substance.  A 
walkthrough of the propositions leading to the conclusion in EIp11, of God's necessary existence, (and 
thus finally clarify EIp14), will reveal why there must be one substance with every possible attribute, and 
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not several substances with different attributes. Here is how it goes: EIp2 tells us that two substances 
with different attributes have nothing in common with one another, and hence, if things have nothing in 
common, the one cannot be the cause of the other (EIp3). Spinoza denies as a consequence that one 
substance  can create  or  produce  another  in EIp6.  By EIp7,  it  is  stated  that  a  substance's  essence 
necessarily involves existence. Reasonably enough, Bennett remarks
It is widely agreed now that the existence of a concrete object – something other than an inhabitant of the third 
realm – never follows from a definition or from a description of a concept. In particular, you cannot infer the 
existence of something on the premise that existence belongs to its essence or its definition.13
This shows the problem of most ontological arguments, but as Bennett goes on to say, there are things 
to be learned from Spinoza's in particular. Spinoza ontologically defines God as a substance, and takes 
this as a sufficient explanation for God's necessary existence because substance is in turn defined as that 
which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require 
the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed. His reason for holding substance as 
necessary existent comes from the view that any genuine substance must be causally self-contained, not  
owing its existence to anything else. But how did that whole affair happen? We can understand how 
something might sustain or keep itself in existence, but how can something just be initially, or push itself 
into existence in the first place? The answer lies in his explanatory rationalism. For a causal rationalist, 
the question ''Could x cause its own existence?'' is the question ''Could x logically necessitate its own 
existence?'' And a logically self-necessitating thing would presumably be one whose nature or essence 
had to be instantiated.14 That is how Spinoza argues, the material for the answer lies in substance's own 
nature. Given this, we need not look further beyond the thing itself, or dig deeper in the ''why'' question-
bag. A substance cannot be caused by anything else, but must be caused by something, so it must be 
caused by itself. Again, we may oppose this idea, but given Spinoza's explanatory rationalism, he needed 
necessarily existing objects and a self-caused substance, with a necessary instantiated nature, was an 
opportunity good as anything.
To summarize, then, Spinoza's argument for substance monism is suspicious, but the main lines is that 
when a necessary existing substance with an infinity of attributes possesses all the attributes that there 
are, there is simply none left for any other conceivable substance. Combining this with the proposition 
that two or more substances cannot share an attribute, the argument for one substance, with all possible 
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attributes, the ends realissimum, is complete.
As known, Spinoza equates this one substance to God, or rather Nature. Deus sive Natura, for him it is 
one and the same thing. This led to both accusations by most of his contemporaries of demonic atheism 
forged in hell (despite of Spinoza's protests to the label of atheism, see for example Ep. 43) as well as 
the later praise from, among others, the more romantic inclined Novalis who said of Spinoza the exact 
opposite, that he was intoxicated with God - Spinoza geradezu ein Gott-trunkener Mensch ist. 
With Spinoza's argumentation for monism sorted out, this allows me to shed a little more light on how 
this said monism is connected with the determinism, or necessitarianism, and the ethical project. Does 
this monism commit Spinoza to the strictest form of necessitarianism? I promised earlier that I would 
defend  the  moderate  necessitarianism-view,  as  the  one  defended  by Curley  and  Walski.15 A more 
elaborate  interpretative  discussion  of  this  will  proceed  in  the  next  section,  §3,  regarding  the 
interpretative landscape, but I will now give an idea based upon the foregoing analysis.
The substance/God/Nature (or  the whole universe) exists with absolute necessity. It  is brought  into 
existence by its own necessary and self-causing nature conceived and sustained through itself and all 
possible attributes belonging to it. All things in the world are composites of this, different modes and 
affections of this totality. Spinoza studies everything in the world accordingly. Whatever follows from 
something  necessary  is  itself  necessary.  Does  this  mean  that  we  all  are  helplessly  subjected  to 
unchangeable fates determined on metaphysical level far beyond our reach? Not quite. But explanatory 
rationalism demands that  for  every event  we must  be able to  track  down the event's  causal chain. 
Nothing ever just happen out of the blue; however obscure the reasons or causes are to us, they are 
there, and they are not random. Like the laws of physics, we may not understand them fully, but the laws 
do not differ from time to time. Conditions may differ and provide different results in seemingly identical 
circumstances, but upon closer examination, this is often due to us not knowing all the variables. This is 
already an indication of what is to come in the Ethics, in the latter parts that concerns a good human life, 
after  the  explicit  metaphysical  issues  I  have  dealt  with  in this  chapter  are  accounted  for.  Spinoza 
proposes that human freedom, happiness and salvation lie in freeing oneself from the bondage of more 
or less random emotions, ignorance and superstition. It is a brute fact of life that forces external to us  
comes our way. We do not like to admit it, but in many cases we do not have total control over our  
existence. Various forces of nature, illness or good health, death, fame, fortune or the loss of it  – albeit  
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sometimes – we cannot  always control  what  comes our  way,  only make adjustments.  Despair  and 
resignation is bondage, says Spinoza. We despair because we are conscious of our wantings but ignorant 
of causes (EI Appendix). In admittance of this loss of control follows understanding and accept of the 
necessary causes. Spinoza is of the belief that this is in this understanding that freedom lies. 
Finite and infinite modes
There is yet another thing to take into consideration to understand fully the question of necessity as  
more than just a purely metaphysical issue, which is the theory of modes. Modes are by EId5 affections 
of the substance, and since it is only substance that  can be and be conceived through itself, modes 
depend on the substance to be conceived and intelligible. Modes are thus conceived through and exist in 
the substance. As affections or modifications of substance, modes can be seen as modifications of the 
attributes of substance. Different things may follow from this in different ways. Spinoza categorizes 
modes into infinite and finite modes. Each mode is a modification of each attribute of substance. Hence, 
for every mode of the attribute of thought there is a mode of the attribute of extension. Spinoza writes in 
IIP7S:
[…] thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended now under this 
attribute, now under that. So, too, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing,  
expressed in two ways. 
Infinite modes are features of the universe following from the substance – or its attributes – in a direct 
manner,  or directly from another infinite mode, which follows directly from the attribute.  These are 
universal and eternal aspects of the universe, and do not come in and go out of existence. The infinite 
modes of extension apply to all finite modes of extension. Infinite modes of extension are exemplified as 
motion and rest, the elements governing bodies in the laws of physics. The infinite modes of thought 
also apply to the finite modes of thought, and are described by Spinoza as the infinite intellect of God. 
We can see this as the totality of logical and psychological laws. Finite modes are all particular things. In 
EIp25c Spinoza writes that particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, that is,  
modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate way.
The finite modes Spinoza talks about in The Ethics are easily identified with what he in The Emendation 
of the Intellect  calls ''mutable particular things''.  This means we can say that e.g. humans are finite 
modes and the laws of physics are infinite modes. However, there's obviously a difference between being 
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a human and being gravity. The infinite modes sustain, whilst the finite modes come and go. Where the 
infinite  modes follow directly from Gods attributes,  the  finite  modes follow from something finite, 
(dependant on and being in the totality of the infinite but not deriving directly from it) which in turn 
follows from something finite and so on. Spinoza explains this in his EIp28 proof:
Whatever is determined to exist and to act has been so determined by God (Pr. 26 and Cor. Pr. 24). But that which  
is finite and has a determinate existence cannot have been produced by the absolute nature of one of God's  
attributes, for whatever follows from the absolute nature of  one of God's attributes is infinite and eternal (Pr. 21). 
It must therefore have followed from God or one of his attributes insofar as that is considered as affected by some 
mode; for nothing exists but substance and its modes (Ax. 1 and Defs. 3 and 5), and modes (Cor. Pr. 25) are  
nothing but affections of God's attributes. But neither could a finite and determined thing have followed from God 
or  one of his  attributes insofar  as  that  is  affected by a modification,  which is eternal  and infinite (Pr.  22).  
Therefore, it must have followed, or been determined to exist and to act, by God or one of his attributes insofar as 
it was modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence.
Strict versus moderate necessitarianism
In some sense, Spinoza is clearly a necessitarian. The interesting question here is, to what degree.
And, will knowledge and acceptance of causes change the turn of one’s willings? The answer for the 
latter question is relevant here but I will save for chapter three and four. Here I first want to examine 
what differentiates moderate necessitarianism from the strict one.
In EIp33s1 Spinoza acknowledges two ways of necessity. The one is by reason of essence; the other is 
by reason of cause. The Scholium is worth quoting in its entirety:
Since I have here shown more clearly than the midday sum that in things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of 
which  they  can  be said  to  be  ''contingent'',  I  now wish  to  explain  briefly  what  we should  understand  by  
''contingent''; but I must first deal with ''necessary'' and ''impossible''. A thing is termed ''necessary'' either by 
reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For a thing's existence necessarily follows either from its essence 
and  definition  or  from a  given  efficient  cause.  Again,  it  is  for  these  same  reasons  that  a  thing  is  termed  
''impossible'' – that is, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction or because there is no  
external cause determined to bring it into existence. But a thing is termed ''contingent'' for no other reason than 
the deficiency of our knowledge. For if we do not know whether the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, 
or  if,  knowing full  well  that  its  essence does not  involve a contradiction,  we still  cannot  make any certain  
judgements as to its existence because the chain of causes is hidden from us, then that thing cannot appear to us 
either as necessary or as impossible. So we term it either ''contingent'' or ''possible''.
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For simplicity's sake, we can say that infinite modes fall into the first category, and finite modes fall into 
the latter. This can be compared to Leibniz's division between truths of reason and truths of fact. Truths 
of  reason are necessary and true  in virtue of the  principle of  contradiction:  their  denial involves a 
contradiction, explicit or implicit. Examples are mathematical and logical truths. Truths of fact are true 
in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason. This means that nothing happens without a reason why it 
should be so or so rather than otherwise. Examples would be existential propositions (except God's, as 
we have seen is that considered as a truth of reason) and singular propositions. Truths of fact are for 
Leibniz contingent as they depend on God's free decision to create this world.16 
Curley writes
Leibniz will allow that truths of fact are necessary in one possible sense of the term. Though they may fail to be 
true and  are  therefore not  absolutely necessary,  nevertheless  they are  hypothetically necessary.  Given  God's  
decision to create this world rather than some other possible world, things could not have been otherwise. But 
God could not have so decided. His decision had a cause in his knowledge that this world would be the best of all 
possible  worlds,  and  it  could  have  been  predicted  with  certainty,  but  it  was  not  absolutely necessary.  And  
therefore, neither is the world which follows from it.17
As we have seen, Spinoza had the different approach that everything that follows from God, i.e., the 
world and everything that exists, follows with necessity. However, this does not necessarily mean that  
everything that  is and happens is inevitable.  I  concur with Curley's interpretation that  all truths are 
necessary, but not all truths are necessary in the same sense.  We can put it this way: it is a necessary 
truth, that some truths, events, actions, existences, or what have you, with necessity have some degree 
of ''leeway''18. Having e.g. 'reasons are causes' in mind, our reasons are brought about due to a variety of 
experiences, external and internal pushes and pulls, beliefs and understandings; i.e. causal factors. The 
interesting question here is whether these reasons are absolutely necessary, or relatively necessary.
If we give several propositions of the kind ''x  exists'', where  x  denotes e.g. ''this table I'm sitting by'', 
''God (deus sive  natura)'',  ''Mick Jagger'',  ''Ruprecht-Karls  Universität''  &c,  we can by EIp24 ''The 
essence of things produced by God does not involve existence'' argue that Spinoza would say that only 
one such true proposition is absolutely necessary and that is that ''God exists''. However, this does not 
prevent other existential claims from being true or necessary in some sense. I believe this means that for 
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some propositions or things it is not necessary in the strictest sense that they exist, or that they exist in 
the particular way they do. But when they first exist the way they do, then the causal chain, antecedent 
causes and circumstances leading up to them in their particular way explains why they necessarily are as 
they are, not that it is inevitable or that they could never exist in some other way, or not exist at all. This 
attention towards  the  difference between absolute  necessity and relative necessity I  find important, 
especially with the later discussion on determining oneself in mind. Considering this, the ''every truth is 
necessary'' appears more moderate.
§3:  The interpretative landscape.
Before I move on to give the final summary and conclusions of this chapter, I wish to give a brief outline 
of some of the interpretative disagreements in Spinozistic scholarship on this area. Some of Spinoza's 
premises and arguments have induced a seemingly endless controversy on precisely what should be the 
outcome. I have already pointed towards a more flexible interpretation of Spinoza's necessity, which will 
shortly be repeated, in my conclusions in summarized form in §4. However, the diversity of readings 
should not be ignored since they contribute to an important plurality of perspectives. Naturally I cannot 
comment on them all, and so I will here continue the debate regarding Spinozistic necessity and possible 
relative necessity from the view of Spinoza interpreters Edwin Curley and Jonathan Bennett.
Curley's argumentation on why every truth is a necessary truth, absolute or relative 
Curley wishes to show that Spinoza's universal denial of contingency is compatible with the admission 
that some truths are contingent19, and holds the claim that Spinoza's determinism has the form:
(1) Every truth is either absolutely or relatively necessary, 
rather than
(2) Every truth is absolutely necessary.
Curley defends this by proposing four assumptions he is confident Spinoza would make to justify (1). 
The assumptions are:
1: The proposition that God exists is absolutely necessary.
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2: All other singular truths, though absolutely contingent, have a scientific explanation, in the sense that 
they follow from a statement of certain antecedent conditions and nomological propositions. Hence they 
are relatively necessary.
3: All accidental general truths, though absolutely contingent, have a scientific explanation in the same 
sense, and hence are also relatively necessary.
4: All nomological general truths are absolutely necessary.20
The question is whether Spinoza would make these claims and how he would support them. The first 
claim hardly need further introduction. It is the ontological claim of EIp11, and has been thoroughly 
considered above.  The second claim is according to  Curley tolerably certain from EIp28 and from 
Spinoza's treating of miracles in the  Theological-Political Treatise.  In the Treatise,  Spinoza reviews 
miracles  as  violating nature’s  regular  laws and believing in them as  mere  human folly,  nonsensical 
superstition based on inadequate knowledge of God/Nature and causes. EIp28 sounds:
Every individual thing, i.e., anything whatever which is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or be 
determined to act unless it  be determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a  
determinate existence, and this cause again cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be determined to exist 
and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so ad infinitum.
How Curley deduces his second claim from this is not immediately clear. It is complex and requires a 
whole chapter long argument.21 That singular truths have scientific explanations and follow from given 
conditions is uncontroversial, and hence it is easy to imagine that if we manipulated one part of a certain 
causal chain the outcome would change. But it remains still somewhat opaque how he can defend that  
all singular truths are absolutely contingent. It could, however, be due to the singular truth’s nature. As I  
showed above, the finite modes are modifications of God, but they do, as we see in EIp28 above, not 
follow directly from God, because finite things according to Spinoza cannot be produced immediately by 
an infinite cause. They are produced by other causes that are individual and finite. To see how this can 
be we can follow Curley’s line-by-line commentary on EIp28:
  Any proposition in  A  (except those which are axioms of scientific theory) must follow from other 
propositions in A.
  But a singular proposition cannot be deduced solely from the axioms of the scientific theory of A, for 
these are general propositions, and from general propositions alone only general propositions can be 
20
deduced.
  A singular proposition must then follow from propositions which are not axioms of the scientific theory 
of  A,  that is, from some theorem of the scientific theory of A,  or from some singular proposition, for 
these are all the propositions that are in A.
  But a singular proposition cannot be deduced (solely) from theorems of the scientific theory of A, for 
these too are general propositions.
  The singular propositions of A must then follow from other singular propositions of A (taken together 
with some general propositions, for it is no more possible to deduce a singular conclusion from singular 
premises alone, than it is to deduce one from general premises alone).22
To sum up the second claim; it is partly based on the confidence that science can explain all questions, 
and partly on the identification of God with nature.  That means in effect that anything singular not 
scientifically explainable would involve a ''miracle'', that is, a contradiction. Therefore singular truths are 
necessary,  but  relative  in the  sense  that  they cannot  be  solely deduced  from absolute  and general 
propositions. The laws of the infinite modes apply to them, but their causal chain is also finite, and hence 
contingent.
The third claim, that  all accidental general truths are relatively necessary, is even harder to  defend. 
Curley states that he finds the documentation in Eip8s2. Here Spinoza wishes to prove that it can only 
be one substance of the same nature, and in the course of his argumentation he suggests an example 
where exactly twenty men exist. For the sake of discussion, not more nor fewer. Spinoza concludes that 
wherever a thing is of a kind, which can have several individuals in it, it must have an external cause.  
Since it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, there can only be one substance of the same kind. 
The reason for Curley to use this particular passage is that he finds the proposition ''exactly twenty men'' 
to  be  an  example  of  an  accidental  generalization,  and  he  points  out  that  Spinoza  assimilates  this 
proposition to singular propositions (as discussed above) and that the generalization of exactly twenty 
men are necessary in the same way as singular propositions are.  In the same way as with singular 
propositions, there is always a logical and necessary cause why exactly twenty men exist when they do, 
but the number twenty is not innate to the essence of men, and hence it is relatively necessary.
Curley's fourth claim is that all nomological truths are absolutely necessary. The nomological truths are 
known to us as general physical and logical laws. Spinoza's own notion of laws is generally defined as 
21
that according to which each individual thing – either all in general or those of the same kind – act in  
one fixed and determinate manner, this manner depending either on Nature's necessity or on human  
will.23 When further distinguishing between the two kinds of laws, Spinoza makes clear the difference 
between descriptive and prescriptive laws. The human prescriptive laws – 'Thou shalt not kill' – are 
empirically breakable, but Spinoza regards on the contrary the laws of nature as possessing the same 
kind of necessity as, he supposed, the proposition of God's or Nature's existence possess. They follow 
necessarily from definitions and are thereby absolutely necessary. Given the identification of the essence 
of God with the fundamental nomological facts this is, as Curley points out, nothing but expected. The 
objection that rises from this is that laws of nature must be established empirically, by examining nature 
through and through, not by drawing conclusions and consequences a priori from definitions. From this 
it can be concluded that scientific laws cannot be absolutely necessary. This assumption implicitly says 
that what is established empirically cannot also be established a priori. Curley believes that Spinoza very 
well could have rejected this latter assumption, and even though we cannot say for certain that Spinoza 
was  right  in  assuming  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  absolutely  necessary,  it  was  intelligible  in  his 
contemporary situation, and it is not a far off conclusion in our own contemporary view either. 
Bennett's discussion on Spinoza's commitment to necessity
Bennett discusses thoroughly both the option of the commitment to allowing contingent truths and the 
commitment  to  ruling  out  contingent  truths24.  As Bennett  notes,  in certain ways Spinoza  commits 
himself to both, i.e. that there are no contingent truths and that this is the only possible world, and yet at 
the same time he commits himself to the opposite. The texts on the subject are difficult and inconclusive, 
but as previously said, there's good reason to attending to them, with respect to better understanding of 
later parts of the Ethics and this paper. 
First Bennett attends to the allowance of contingent truths. He also turns to what Spinoza said about 
miracles in the  Theological-Political  Treatise,  underlining that  Spinoza equals miracles and random 
events, respectively as something that falls under the antecedent of a law but not its consequent and 
something not falling under antecedent or consequent of any law. Bennett refers to Ax3, from a given 
determinate cause there necessarily follows an effect; on the other hand, if there be no determinate  
cause, it is impossible that an effect should follow. Here Spinoza says what he frequently repeated, that 
the laws cannot be broken, and that nothing ever just happens without antecedent causes. Bennett points 
to an important aspect Spinoza apparently never thought of, that the first half of the axiom rules out 
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basic causal laws which are probabilistic. However, I do not consider that as a serious fault by Spinoza,  
and I will briefly return to the coverage of probabilistic causes in the summary of this chapter. After 
stating what sort of things that hold an undisputedly necessary position – the logic, the geometry and the 
physics – the world’s infinite and eternal features, instantiated everywhere and always, Bennett turns his 
attention to  the features the world has locally or  temporarily, i.e.  the particular things from EIp28.  
Spinoza used the word 'things', but the topic in matter includes all local or temporal (or both) states,  
events and situations at  any metaphysical level according to  Bennett.  He thus proceeds to  say what 
already has been explained, that every particular item must be caused by other particulars and not by the 
infinite and eternal items. He explains:
If a particular clap of thunder were necessitated by the laws of physics, there would be thunder everywhere and 
always. What we can say, according to Spinoza, is that every clap of thunder is caused by an antecedent particular,  
this causation proceeding through the laws of physics.25
This picture of the causation of particulars makes it unproblematic for Spinoza to say that everything is 
caused by God or Nature, due to the two kinds of causal input: one is an infinite chain of finite items  
which is causally prior to  particular events,  and the other is a finite chain of infinite items, i.e.  the 
sequence of ever more general physical laws ending in the attribute of extension26. Each of these belongs 
to God or Nature, the former is a series of finite modes and the latter is the unfolding of one of God’s or 
Nature’s attributes in its infinite modes. This also supports EIp18, which says that God is the imminent,  
not the transitive, cause of all things. When a particular comes into being, causal influence is exerted on 
it from an antecedent particular, but its causation from God or Nature is indwelling, as embodying the 
laws or as ultimate subject for both particulars.
So we have the class of necessary propositions and the class of particular propositions. As we have seen, 
the latter kind cannot follow from the first kind. Bennett  asks: does this entail that every particular 
proposition is contingent? Bennett is less bold than Curley in his conclusion, and says that it does so 
according to most systems of entailment logic, in which it is a theorem that a necessary proposition is  
entailed by every proposition. Other than this theorem, for which he finds no reason for believing that 
Spinoza was aware of,  he simply states that  he cannot  find anything else in EIP28 that  entails that 
particular propositions are contingent, and that the strongest pressure on Spinoza to allow that at least 
some propositions are contingent comes from the difficulty of doing good philosophy while staying 
faithful  to  the  thesis  that  this  is  the  only possible  world.  By the  same token,  many of  Spinoza's 
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philosophical moves are invalid if there is no contingency:
For example, his uses of the concept of a thing's  essence,  meaning those of its properties which it  could not  
possibly lack, are flattened into either falsehood or vacuous truth if there are no contingent truths; because then 
every property of every thing is essential to it. […] See also 3p6d, which purports to show that nothing can,  
unaided, cause its own destruction; if all a thing's properties are essential to it,  then this argument ought to  
conclude that nothing can, unaided, cause any change in itself27.
The way I understand this, it would make the striving towards self-improvement and self-determinism 
considerably more difficult, and the pillars for Spinoza's ethical project would break under the weight of 
necessary essential properties. So there are good reasons for affirming that there are contingent truths, 
but  at  the  same time  Spinoza  has  fundamental  assumptions  which commit  him to  there  being  no 
contingent truth. Where does he, according to Bennett come out? EIp33 says that things could not be 
produced by God in any other way or in any other order than they have been produced. This has been 
interpreted by scholars like Bennett  to  say that  there are  no contingent  truths28.  However,  Bennett 
changed his mind after careful reading of the proposition, and concludes that it shows that what being 
asserted is just causal rationalism. The causal laws, which govern the universe in the sense that they 
determine the 'way' and the 'order' in which things are produce, could not possibly have been different. 
When the 'way' and the 'order' in which 'things are produced' merely refer to causal laws that govern the 
sequels of particulars,  Spinoza is asserting the necessity of causal laws, not  of all truths.  It  is very 
important to discriminate between the two causal inputs. The two chains mentioned above, the infinite 
chain of finite items and the finite chain of infinite items, point towards Spinoza's notions of necessary by 
reason of cause and necessary by reason of essence. Bennett remarks that by applying this distinction, 
the distinction between what necessity a thing has and where a thing gets it necessity from, Spinoza is 
adopting a concept of acquired necessity. The question ''Where does P get its necessity from?'' can be 
answered by saying that the necessity arises from acquired necessity and is there by reason of previous 
cause/s, developed through environmental forces. On the other hand, the question ''What necessity does 
P have?'' is a much more difficult one, at least on a meta-level, though we have tried to  answer for 
God's/Nature’s inherent necessity hitherto in the paper. Bennett compares this with acquired authority: 
Your inherent excellence makes people conform to your wishes, whereas they conform to mine because authority 
was conferred on me by a political appointment. I may have as much authority as you, but the source is different29.
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And he then further explains that this provides a way for Spinoza to hold that (i) this is the only possible 
world, while still acknowledging that (ii) particular propositions are not necessary in the way that truths 
of logic and mathematics are, thus doing justice (i) to the demands of explanatory rationalism and (ii) to 
the prima facie evidence that there are contingent truths – and to EIp28. However, there's yet another 
problem with this. According to Bennett, Spinoza needs acquired necessity to be absolute; a proposition 
that has it must be true at all possible worlds because otherwise it would fail to meet the demands of  
explanatory rationalism. Therefore Bennett proposes the equation
P has acquired necessity = some Q that is absolutely necessary entails P.
This definition makes acquired necessity identical with necessity: any P satisfying it is as inherently 
necessary as any other. Bennett sums up by speculating that Spinoza flirted with the notion of acquired 
necessity and failed to grasp that it would not meet his needs. 
§4: The necessary monism and what it means
p1: There must be a substance with every possible attribute.
p2: There cannot be two substances with an attribute in common.
p3: There cannot be more than one substance.
p4: This substance is equal to God, or Nature.
The three first postulates are Bennett's summary of EIp14, I add the fourth. Here we have in short what 
Spinoza is aiming to explain in the first book of the Ethics, and it is these notions that keeps running 
through the work in its entirety and determines later propositions. This substance monism proposes that  
the entire universe is not to be divided into several substances, and that there is no gap between the 
mental and the extended realm. It  is all the same substance and when we experience the difference 
between something mental and something extended, it is the instantiated attributes, i.e., the same kind of 
'stuff',  now seen under  the  attribute  of thought,  now under  the attribute  of extension.  Further,  the  
attributes have modes, infinite modes are sustaining and valid at all times and experienced through laws 
of nature, physical laws, logic and psychology. Finite modes are dependent on these, but have their own 
causal chain where infinite, or at least to us an unknown number, of causes do their work and produce 
25
things, events &c in a necessary way and order. As we have seen there are different forms of necessity 
and although there are still disagreements I will hold that many aspects of this world have not absolute, 
but acquired necessity or relative necessity – but we can in a way say that also this form of necessity is 
absolute in its contingency.  
It is important to keep clear what we really talk about in the discussion of necessity versus contingency.  
Intuitively, it is easy to confuse strict necessity with fatalism, and contingency with the other extreme of 
some  sort  of  'random'  free  will  or  events.  Neither  of  these  are  attractive  options  practically  or 
philosophically, and I do not think many people consciously holds them in their most extreme form, even 
though one finds several forms of more or less self-conscious theorizing about explanation outside of 
philosophy  and  science.  Spinoza's  aim  to  establish  the  centrality  of  cause  and  explanation  in  a 
philosophical work regarding ethics, shows that his goal was not only a purely universal ontological or 
scientific one,  but  also local and ethical,  concerning singular  individuals’ freedom and contentment.  
Because  we  do  deeply  feel  the  need  to  understand  what's  going  on,  an  interest  in  causes  and 
explanations pervades our lives. Woodward writes aptly: 
We wonder why our cars won't  start,  why corn grows better  in  one field that  another,  why a friend seemed  
particularly happy or gloomy yesterday. Scientists wonder why elementary particles have the mass they do, why 
the universe is, at a sufficiently large scale, (nearly) flat with a uniform mass distribution, why there are so many  
non-coding regions in the human genome, and why the dinosaurs became instinct30.
Seeing that so many effects have direct impact on our lives it is important to understand their reasons 
and causes. Sure, for understanding in its own right, but also to make things happen, or for maximizing 
beneficial  results.  Roughly,  the  difference  between  description  and  causal  explanation  lies  here: 
descriptive knowledge may be the  basis  for  prediction,  classification and systemization.  Maybe we 
cannot change what is being described, but it allows for better understanding and fewer surprises and 
less bedazzlement. In causal explanations we identify factors or conditions allowing us to potentially 
manipulate them and cause change in the outcome, and thus it is of highly practical interest for humans.  
So then, what explains a causal relation in itself? Is a causal chain leading up to some particular finite 
event necessary by reason of its  essence  or necessary by reason of its  cause,  so to speak? Spinoza's 
embracement of the principle of sufficient reason and of explanatory rationalism demands coherent and 
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logical explanations of everything, and every explicable thing is necessary the way it appears, from its 
particular previous conditions and previous antecedent causes. This is absolutely necessary. But  how a 
given particular  turns  out  is not  set  in stone  in the  borderline fatalistic necessary manner.  We can 
descriptively predict, but if the chances are given we can also intervene and change the course to change 
a particular outcome, or we can leave it be. I do not think Spinoza would have any violent objections to  
this form of 'contingency'. The form of contingency he did oppose, however, was the one previously 
mentioned from EIp33s1, where he defines contingency as something we give the term 'contingent' 
because we know not better, we do not know the thing in question's nature or essence, or the causes 
which would have explained it fully are hidden from us. Hence Spinoza's criticism of ''miracles'' and 
aversion against whatever termed 'totally random'. This is not the least to say that there does not exist an 
extensive arsenal of hypothetically necessary items and propositions that  may or may not come into 
being, just that for these to be actualized, they must have the necessary preceding conditions and causes. 
If these previous conditions were met, the arisen effect is necessary. If you mix together the ingredients 
to make a Molotov cocktail, you don't get surprised because you produced a Molotov cocktail and not a 
rainbow. That is a matter of necessary chemistry. The effect is necessary by reason of its cause, and one 
particular finite thing may or may not exist because that particular item is not essential to the whole, or 
to the substance. 
In conclusion, I again repeat that I think it is appropriate to appeal to the thesis that Spinoza can be seen 
as  a  moderate  necessitarian,  consistently  affirming  both  necessitarianism and  its  denial,  or  rather, 
affirming that his necessity was, accordingly, both absolute and relative. Spinoza's use of following-from 
necessity is a causal use of the modal transfer principle, as we have seen, if y follows from x, and x is 
necessary, then y must be necessary.  This causal relation is also a conceptual relation (''the order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things'' EIIp7). Further, Spinoza writes 
in EIp35: Whatever we conceive to be within God's power necessarily exists. We can conceive several 
outcomes,  and this  at  least  suggests  that  the  way things  are  conceived or  considered  are  modally 
significant. Modality is not wholly an extensional affair, it is also a chain of concepts or ideas reaching to 
the concept of God or Nature. Considering one particular finite mode in relation to the entire collection 
of modes, considered as a whole, the particular exists necessarily. But considered in itself, related to its 
own finite chain, the particular is contingent. 
I have already to suggested how modality and monism is connected to ethics in Spinoza's thought. In the 
third and fourth chapter I will link this to Spinoza's notions of being active, determining oneself as to  
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achieve freedom from bondage, viewing the world under what he called the aspect of eternity, showing 
that his metaphysical conclusions have consequences for his ethical theory. But before that, it is time to 
see how Spinoza deals with the human mind. That will be the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter Two: The Mind-Body Problem.
Titling this chapter  The Mind-body Problem  might  be a  little exaggerated,  but  not  misleading.  The 
Mind-Body problem concerns the questions of how two such arguably different phenomena, properties 
or concepts as the mental and the physical are related to one another. In the history of philosophy a vast 
number of theories and possible solutions to the mind-body problem have been offered; some of them 
intersect, others have caused a vendetta between respective philosophers. I will not shed much new light 
on that general discussion. When I nevertheless call this chapter  The Mind-Body problem, it is due to 
Spinoza's efforts to advance towards adequate knowledge on the subject matter. When Spinoza in the 
Ethics moves from the first book Concerning God to the second book Of the Nature and Origin of the  
Mind, he is taking a step back from the overall metaphysical framework he introduced – a framework 
which also included important cornerstones in his understanding of the physical/extended world's ''make 
up'' – and a step towards the human mind; what it is, and what its relation to matter is. We have already 
seen that  Spinoza finds Descartes'  solution untenable.  There cannot  be two  substances,  one that  is 
thought and one that is extension. This solution makes the nature of communication between mind and 
body incomprehensible. Spinoza is thus carrying his metaphysical one substance doctrine of the entire 
universe over into the realm of human beings, bodies and minds. With this move he is trying to develop 
further his one substance doctrine of God or Nature, and the unity of the two attributes of thought and 
extension as something constituting our very nature. In humans this is body and mind, and this matter is 
important in our context because the linking of the one substance doctrine with parallelism of body and 
mind has important implications for Spinoza's ethics, and is thus important for my next chapters on, of 
course, Spinoza's ethics. 
The last chapter established some of Spinoza's most fundamental principles. 
(1) There exists only one single substance, and this substance is identical to God or Nature. 
(2) God or Nature exists with absolute necessity.
(3)  This one substance comprises all possible attributes, of which we know thought and extension. 
(4) Everything that  follows from God or  Nature,  i.e.  infinite and finite modes follows also with 
necessity (but with respectively absolute and relative such). 
Spinoza's task becomes thus to  show how his underlying principles also apply to  human minds and 
individuals. A problem (among others, but this is the one I will focus on for now) appears with (1) One 
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substance doctrine, and (3) concept dualism. In trying to reconcile these he proposes that the order and 
connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things (EIIp7).  But  with  this 
proposition, i.e. parallelism, he does not completely succeed in his efforts to show that the two are one 
and the same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that (EIIp7s).
Understanding the parallelism thesis may be key to further understanding of e.g. emotion, understanding, 
intent, willings and action. Hence this chapter, albeit its shortcomings on a supremely interesting topic, 
due to the limitations of this thesis, is here intended more as a bridge between the first chapter, with its 
focus on the metaphysical framework, and chapters three and four with their focus on ethics, willings, 
freedom, and human joy. This places mental causation in the spotlight, because it asks the question of 
how mental properties can or cannot be causally relevant to bodily behavior.
My main aim is to clarify what we mean when we talk about Spinoza's Parallelism thesis, i.e. what it is 
and what  is  implies.  I  will present  three  takes  on  parallelism,  using  the  three  Spinoza  interpreters 
Bennett, Curley, and Della Rocca, and give a brief account of their respective interpretations. I do not 
intend to do a qualitative analysis, except to briefly touch upon whether, or to what degree Spinoza 
succeeds in his efforts on showing that thought and extension are really one and the same thing.
§5:   Parallelism
The first important proposition explicit regarding parallelism is EIIp7:  The order and connection of  
ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. In the following proof, Spinoza writes that this 
is evident from EIax.4; for the idea of what is caused depends on the knowledge of the cause of which it  
is the effect.  This is rather cryptic, and I do not find it as evident as Spinoza did, nor do many others 
seem to. I will therefore present three interpretations below; that of Bennett, a subtle and speculative 
interpretation which claims that body and mind are  not  fully identical, but merely share a part, which 
Bennett calls ''trans-attribute''. Further, the thesis of Curley, which holds that Spinoza's parallelism simply 
means that the extended material world is a set of facts, and that the thinking or mental world is a set of 
propositions that express those facts. Lastly, the interpretation of Della Rocca, which hold the view that  
minds and bodies are fully identical in Spinoza, i.e. numerically identical, and that the referential opacity 
in Spinoza allows this identity without  violating the demand that different attributes cannot  interact.  
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However, a full understanding of Della Rocca's interpretation demands a detailed in-depth understanding 
of his argument for a new interpretation of attributes, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
representation in Spinoza that he works out. I will therefore limit myself to his criticism of Bennett's 
interpretation, and a few of his alternative solutions with focus on mind-body, or numeric-mode-identity 
– to get the general idea of it. Hopefully this overview will offer a picture on how the one substance 
doctrine  is  compatible  with  the  idea  of  parallelism,  and  how  parallelism can be  understood  as  an 
important brick in the wall of Spinoza's ethics.
Bennett: Mental-Physical parallelism
Bennett holds that the mind and the body share a part, which he calls ''trans-attribute mode'', but he does 
not think the mind and the body are fully identical beyond that. This is his background for advancing a 
mode-identity interpretation, where minds and bodies are not  fully identical, but all contain a trans-
attribute feature, which can be combined with the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension,  
creating a mind and a body at the same time. Keeping in touch with the proposition of Spinoza that they 
are one and the same thing he calls this mode-identity because my mind and my body is a  (trans-
attribute) mode combined with the attribute of extension, and at the same time with the attribute of 
thought. Bennett’s argumentation for this interpretation is the following. 
Bennett writes that what Spinoza offers us is not mere parallelism, a matching of facts about the body 
with facts about the mind. Bennett means that Spinoza offer an explanation of why the matching holds. 
According to Bennet then, Spinoza's parallelism thesis is asymmetrical, with the body having primacy31. 
He finds his evidence for this in EIIp13s:
To determine what is the difference between the human mind and others, and how it surpasses them, we have to 
know the nature of the human body. In proportion as a body is more capable than others of doing or undergoing 
many things  at  once,  so its  mind  is  more  capable than  others  of perceiving  many things  at  once.  And in  
proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, so its mind is more capable of understanding  
distinctly.
Bennett finds accordingly that Spinoza allows some descriptions of mental items to depend on how the 
corresponding physical items are described, but he denies that this means deserting concept dualism. 
What he proposes is a thesis where the mental realm runs parallel to the physical realm:
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I shall offer respectable reasons, which Spinoza could have had and I think did have, for accepting this drastically 
strong thesis that a mental realm runs parallel in the finest detail to the physical realm. But it will be seen that 
these reasons, which depend heavily on empirical fact and on certain broad assumptions about science, could not 
easily have been shaped up into the sort of demonstration Spinoza liked to give in the Ethics. I conjecture that  
that is why he instead offered the weak, cryptic argument that we find in the text32.
The said weak and cryptic argument is EIIp7. EIIp7 refers us to  EIax4, which says  the knowledge 
[cognition] of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge [cognition] of the cause.  The Latin 
word is cognitio, and, as in my translation, it is often translated as knowledge. Bennett uses cognition, 
because he means that there is abundant evidence that Spinoza means it broader than just knowledge; 
Although 'cognition' can be a term in psychology, Spinoza is also willing to use it to mean 'concept',  
taking the latter to belong to logic.33 Thus, if EIax4 is read in a logical way, it says that if x causes y then 
there is a conceptual link between them, this being a part of causal rationalism. This is how Spinoza 
construes the axiom in his other uses of it. However, Bennett continues, this cannot be the case here – in 
EIIp7d the axiom must be taking 'cognition' to stand for something mental: If x causes y then a mental  
item related in a certain way to y must involve a mental item related in the same way to x. Otherwise  
the axiom cannot even seem to imply a parallelism between the physical and the mental.34
The alternative is to read both the axiom and the parallelism doctrine as logical. This is what Curley 
does. Bennett grants Curley a neat account of the parallelism, but will not accept that the Ethics is silent 
about  mentality.  Curley implies  that  Spinoza  is  willing to  give the  title  'Paul's  mind'  to  the  set  of 
propositions which truly describes Paul's body35 and Bennett declines to believe that Spinoza would use 
'mind' in that eccentric fashion.36 However, I will explicate Curley's view further below in the dedicated 
section.
Bennett's defense of a strong doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism is partly based on EIIp3, which 
together with its proof reads the following:
In God there is necessarily the idea both of his essence and of everything that  necessarily follows from his  
essence.
Proof: For God can (Pr. 1, II) think infinite things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by Pr. 16, I) can 
form the idea of his own essence and of everything that necessarily follows from it. But all that is in God's power 
necessarily exists (Pr. 35, I). Therefore, such an idea necessarily exists, and only in God. 
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So EIIp3 asserts according to Bennett the existence of a mental item corresponding to every physical 
item, whilst EIIp7 adds the further claim that this correspondence maps causal chains onto causal chains. 
These chains run parallel because Spinoza doesn’t allow causal interaction between the attributes. 
Conventional wisdom says that human beings cognitively assess a situation, which creates an emotion, 
which then again directs a response expressed by the body. We see someone who looks like an old friend 
at  the airport,  he waves and smiles, we become happy and hug the old friend; we see a snake, are 
frightened and run; we are insulted by someone, get angry and leave in indignation. It seems natural to  
assume that  when all this is going on there are two causal chains that  interact.  A visual impact  or 
someone’s impact on my eardrums causes a belief to be acquired or brings back a previous experience or 
association, and that causes a bodily movement, like a hug, a sprint or walking away in resentment. 
However, since Spinoza cannot allow this causal flow between thought and extension, Bennett writes, 
this gives him a reason for conjecturing that there is a psycho-physical parallelism in the universe. He 
further exemplifies:
I stab you, you feel pain, you cry out. Spinoza cannot allow the causal chain from stabbing to feeling to crying, 
but he must grant some deep, reliable connection is involved. His parallelism thesis lets him explain the data  
without admitting interaction, because it says that there are two causal chains:
Stab → O(Feeling) → Cry
I(Stab) → Feeling → I(Cry)37
Bennett uses 'I(x)' to name the idea of x, and 'O(x)' to name the object of x. What he proposes is a 
critique of regular belief, where we often conclude that there is a causal flow both ways, where stabs 
cause pain, which cause cries. The belief is plausible, though, through regular patterns in our experience, 
and objection to parallelism is legitimate. Bennett is aware of the obstacles of parallelism, and asks, why 
not accept interactionism instead? All we have to do is to reject dualism or causal rationalism. However, 
his intention in the present work I am referring to is not to debate dualism and its merits, but to adopt it 
as a premise for the serious consideration of Spinoza. He continues to say that if we suspend dualism, 
the present topic is annihilated. The same does not hold for causal rationalism, and he therefore finds 
that  mental-physical  interaction  is  not  downright  impossible.38 The  answer  'yes'  to  two  questions 
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determines now whether we shall find new strength in support of parallelism of causal chains: (1) Are 
there still reasons for thinking that mental-physical interaction does not happen? And (2) if so, would 
their force have been felt by Spinoza? 
A flow from mental to physical would bring uncomfortable difficulties to physical science because then 
some questions could only be answered when we know how, if at all, that a physical system relates to a 
mind. There are also good reasons to believe that Spinoza must have been aware of the promises of the 
recently invented microscope, to object on scientific grounds that the mental intrudes on the physical.
It is more difficult to reject that the physical can act on the mental. However, denying causal flow from 
mental to physical but allow it the other way means that we commit ourselves to 'danglers'. Those are 
laws according to  which causal influence runs  along a certain channel and then stops,  rather  than 
producing effects that in their turn have a causal bearing on the rest of the world. From Spinoza's view 
that would be intolerable, and Bennett concludes that Spinoza could not make a case against physical to 
mental causal influence except by objecting to all causal flow between attributes.39
However, if someone holds that physical systems have mental effects, it is natural to assume that they 
would say that some do (e.g. animal kingdom) and some do not (e.g. inanimate nature), Spinoza is 
under pressure to  accept a form of panpsychism. The sort  of panpsychism Spinoza embraces is not 
merely one, which says that no sharp mental/non-mental line divide the physical realm, rather the line 
encloses it.40 This is not to say that physical things has a mind proper so-called. According to Bennett, all 
Spinoza needs to claim is that the phenomena we recognize as mental are complexes of, and are thus 
causally continuous with, phenomena associated with very simple physical things.
So, Spinoza thinks (i) that there is a mapping between the physical mental realms, and (ii) that there is 
no  causal  relation  between  them.  He  rejects  on  principle  causal  flow  between  attributes,  but  the 
panpsychism version  of  parallelism is  hard  to  defend.  If  there  is  no  causal  flow between the  two 
attributes,  then what  keeps them in step? Bennett  proposes a 'mode-identity' thesis.  We know from 
EIIp7s that Spinoza viewed thinking substance and extended substance as one and the same thing, seen 
under different attributes. This means that between a physical particular and its mental correlate there is 
not only a correlation but an identity – that  is,  x=I(x) – and that  is why parallelism holds. Bennett 
explains:
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The clue to that is his thesis that these particulars are modes, ways that reality is, properties of the universe. If my 
mind is a mode and my body is a mode, and my mind is my body, it follows that my mind is the same mode as my 
body. I submit that that is Spinoza's doctrine: his thesis about the identity of physical and mental particulars is 
really about the identity of properties. He cannot be saying that physical P1 = mental M1; that is impossible  
because they belong to different attributes. His thesis is rather if P1 is systematically linked with M1, then P1 is 
extension-and-F for some differentia F such that M1 is thought-and-F.41
To sum up:
A: Spinoza must assert that the extended substance is the thinking substance, and
B: that each extended mode is a thinking mode and conversely, and
C: the thesis of mental-physical parallelism is asserted through A and B42
Now Bennett has to reconcile Spinoza's dualism with his mode-identity interpretation. He does so by 
stressing that the concept dualism is not threatened, what we have to do is drop the idea that there is a  
concept corresponding to every property.43 Bennett  writes that Spinoza insists that causal or  logical 
connections depend on what is intellectually graspable. And the trans-attribute differentiae cannot be 
intellectually grasped or conceived, i.e.,  there are no concepts of them, and so, since we do not get 
property dualism, the conflict vanishes.
So, Bennett does think that there is some trans-attribute feature, what he calls ''Differentiae F'', and this 
can be added to extension (extension and F) and to thought (thinking and F). This way Bennett can 
make sense of the attributes as something that are really distinct from each other, whilst at the same time 
they assert the claim of identity made by Spinoza in EIIp7s. Bennett admits that this is not what Spinoza 
explicitly says, but holds that it is a plausible interpretation which solves several of Spinoza's difficult  
problems.  The  unabstractable  differentiae  suggests  that  Bennett  holds  that  at  the  very  ground  of 
Spinoza's ontology there exists some sort of a ''fundamental feature'', but conceptually we can't grasp it 
without either thought or extension, but in return, when we grasp whatever feature of the universe, it 
can be grasped both physical and mental. But what is this trans-attribute differentiae F that Bennett is 
attributing to Spinoza? Bennett himself asks:
Why should we believe that the facts about my body and my mind are explained by there being an F which is 
instantiated  in  (Extended  and  F)  and  also  in  (Thinking  and  F),  if  we cannot  abstract  it  from the  former  
combination and track it across the latter one?44 
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Bennett made a subtle account of a very difficult subject, but he has been bending the text and attributed 
views to Spinoza that he did not express, and which we cannot for sure know he held. So when he 
answers his own question from above, it is by putting words in Spinoza's mouth:
In the face of this, Spinoza could reasonably say: 'you are right that I could not adduce a single instance of the 
phenomenon I am talking about. To single out an instance would be to abstract, so it wouldn't be an instance. But 
I do have a general reason for thinking that there are these unabstractable trans-attribute differentiae. If there are, 
the parallelism is deeply and beautifully explained; if there are not, it is a strange universal, brute fact'.45
This is a speculative move from Bennett, but we shall let him get away with that for now, and take a  
look on how Curley interprets Spinoza's parallelism. After that, in the section on Della Rocca, I will 
attend to his criticism of Bennett's account.
Curley: Logical parallelism
Curley takes, as mentioned, as different route from Bennett. First of all, Curley substitutes the term idea 
with proposition.46 He holds that ideas for Spinoza involve activity of mind (EIIp49s). Spinoza's ideas 
are of the kind that follow from and entail one another, and they can be true or false in the sense of  
agreeing with their object. This makes Curley suggest:
that we can do reasonable justice to Spinoza's concept of the relation between thought and extension if we think of 
the relation between thought and extension as an identity of true proposition and fact. It is misleading to say, even 
though Spinoza himself says it, that a true idea agrees with the object (read ''a true proposition agrees with the 
fact''), because the mode of extension  and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two 
different ways. The fact and the true proposition are the same thing, expressed or viewed in two different ways.47
This means that to talk about something extended, a fact, having causal relations with other facts is 
seeing  a  mode  under  the  attribute  of  extension.  To  talk  about  it  as  a  proposition  or  idea,  with 
logical/causal relations to other propositions is seeing the same (mode) thing or fact under the attribute 
of thought.  The propositions which make up a complete  and accurate  description of the world are 
identical with the facts that they describe, and the causal relations between facts have their counterpart  
in the logical relations between propositions (cf. EIIp7). Curley suggests therefore a logical reading, 
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where the thinking mode under the attribute of thought,  which is the counterpart  or identical to  an 
extended mode or  a concrete  fact  under  the attribute  of extension,  is a  proposition bearing logical 
relations to other propositions. Wherever you have a two facts standing in causal relation, you have also 
two propositions standing in a logical relation, and the world of extension and of thought are not two, 
but one.48
Curley gives the somewhat roughly analogy of how Aristotle relates form to matter. A concrete object is 
a unity, which can be thought of as separable into two elements: that is the form, or universal element,  
capable of characterizing many objects; and the matter, or particular element, which makes the object 
this  particular  object.  Further  Curley assumes that  a  concrete  situation is  also  analyzable into  two 
elements,  an abstract  pattern,  which can characterize many situations; and a particularizing element, 
which makes it  this  particular situation. However, there is a difficulty to this analogy. The relation of 
form to  matter is a many-one relation, and a plurality of forms may characterize one and the same 
object. The same might be said of propositions to fact, or to actions. This is something Donald Davidson 
nicely describes in Actions, Reasons and Causes: 
I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to the fact 
that I am home. Here I need not have done four things, but only one, of which four descriptions have been given.49 
What is difficult about this is that Spinoza requires the relation between modes to be a one-one relation. 
So what are the identity conditions for facts? Curley admits the question is a very obscure one. Curley 
needs a correspondence theory of truth to interpret Spinoza, a view that supposes that there are just as 
many facts as there are distinct true propositions.50 
Suppose the fact that my watch is made of gold is a mode of the attribute of extension. Then the true proposition 
that my watch is made of gold is a mode of the attribute of thought. The true proposition is the idea in thought of 
the mode of extension, it is its form, or, if you like, its mind. I think Spinoza would be willing enough to say this. 
When he says that the human mind is the idea of the human body (EIIp13), he is not crediting the human body 
with anything that any other mode of extension does not have.51
This is what Bennett criticizes, as I mention above. According to Bennett, this correlation between facts 
and true propositions gets Spinoza's parallelism doctrine out of any conceivable trouble, but the price is 
to make the doctrine empty and lacking any metaphysical significance, and besides, the use of 'mind' 
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becomes very eccentric.52 Della Rocca finds Curley's reading problematic as well. He says that ideas 
can't be abstract propositions or mere logical entities because for Spinoza ideas are often equated with 
perceptions  and  cases  of  knowledge,  and  ''perception''  and  ''knowledge''  certainly  seem  to  be 
psychological terms.53 Curley speaks of  ideas of  ideas as  a necessary condition for  knowledge and 
consciousness to rise, and in identifying the possession of an idea of an idea with consciousness, he 
describes  it  as  a  special kind of  proposition about  a  proposition,  namely what  is sometimes called 
propositional  attitude,54 i.e.,  a  relation  between a  person and a  proposition,  such as  belief,  desire, 
intention, &c. Given what we know of how Curley interprets ideas, going from that to propositional 
attitudes seems to me somewhat strange, but at least he opens up for psychology. 
In explaining for this, Curley has to account of how external things affect us and how we can have ideas 
of them. He refers to (EIIp17s):
[…] this gives a  clear  understanding of the difference between the idea,  e.g.,  of Peter,  which constitutes the  
essence of Peter's mind, and on the other hand the idea of Peter which is in another man, say Paul. The former  
directly explicates the essence of Peter's body and does not involve existence except as long as Peter exists. The 
latter indicates the constitution of Paul’s body rather than the nature of Peter; and so, while that constitution of  
Paul’s  body continues to be,  Paul's  mind  will  regard  Peter  as  present  to  him  although  Peter  may not  be in  
existence. 
Curley asks: How is it that the idea of Peter which is in Paul is appropriately described as an idea of  
Peter when what it agrees with is a modification of Paul's body? This is not merely a mental image, 
because Spinoza explicitly rules this out a number of places.55  So Paul's idea of Peter is not a mental 
image, but rather a conception of thought (EIIp48s). But how then, is it an idea of Peter?
Our question has an answer, if not a satisfactory one. EIIp16-17 gives us justification for saying that an idea that 
''indicates''  the  constitution  of  Paul’s  body is  an  idea  of Peter:  the  idea  in  Paul’s  mind  has  as  an  object  a  
modification of Paul’s body that ''involves'' the nature of Peter.56
What  it  is  for  a  modification  of  Paul's  body to  involve  Peter's  nature  is  according to  EIIp17,  its 
demonstration and corollary, is that when a human body is affected in a way which involves the nature of 
some external body, the human mind will regard this external body as existing until the mind undergoes a 
new affection or modification which excludes the said presence of the body. But the mind is also able to  
regard as present external bodies by which the human body has been once affected, even if they do not 
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longer exist. Further, these ideas of external objects are confused, according to EIIp28 and its definition:
The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear 
and distinct, but confused.
The ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature both of external bodies and of the human body 
itself (Pr. 16, II), and must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts. For affections are 
modes in which parts of the human body (Post. 3), and consequently the body as a whole, are affected. But (Prs. 
24 and 25, II) an adequate knowledge of external bodies, as also of the component parts of the human body, is not 
in God insofar as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but insofar as he is considered as affected by 
other  ideas.  Therefore,  these ideas  of affections,  insofar  they are  related  only to the  human  mind,  are  like  
conclusions without premises; that is, as is self evident, confused ideas.  
This means that among all the propositions in A, there are some which describe Paul, but at least some 
of these propositions describing Paul is not solely deducible from Paul alone, and deducing the latter will 
require some propositions describing facts about bodies external to Paul's. 
Suppose  one  such  proposition,  say  p,  requires  as  a  premise  for  its  deduction  from the  laws  of nature  the  
proposition of q, where q describes some fact about Peter's body. In such a case we shall say that  p involves q,  
which describes Peter's nature and therefore p ''asserts'' (ponit) the existence of the nature of Peter's body. That is, 
p would be an idea which primarily indicates the constitution of Paul's body, but it is also an idea of Peter. 57  
Curley adds that if this is a correct account of how Spinoza thought that we have knowledge of the 
external world, then we can begin to see why he regarded that knowledge as necessarily inadequate. I 
will say a bit more about inadequate and adequate ideas below in §7. For now, since Curley annihilates 
several of the problems related with parallelism due to his logical reading of the doctrine, I will only say 
a few concluding words before I move on to Della Rocca's account.
My intuitive main like and dislike with Curley is his logical reading. The way he matches and identifies 
the extended reality with its proper meaning or proposition is tempting, and cancels out several annoying 
problems in Spinoza. Maybe that also is part of the problem. I will repeat what Bennett notes; this leaves 
Spinoza's doctrine tame, empty and in lack of metaphysical significance. It just seems too easy. Maybe 
Curley's interpretation is right, and other interpretations complicate it beyond recognition. But the way I 
see it, a problem with Curley's logical reading is that it is in a way ''anthropomorphizing'' the reality in 
order to make it fit into a limited human logical motivation, and it leaves me wondering whether it is a 
parallelism between a real sphere of extension and a real sphere of thought, or merely a parallelism 
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between a sphere of extension and a sphere of construed language ''made to fit our needs''.
Della Rocca: Numeric identity
As I mentioned earlier, I cannot within the limits of this paper attend to the whole complexity of Della 
Rocca's skilful interpretation, and a good account would demand more pages than I have to my disposal. 
However, I will illuminate some of his views on Spinoza's theory of the mind-body problem through his 
criticism of Bennett. In that way I can also shed some light on the contrast between two interpretations, 
and by doing so, on the general discussion.
Where Bennett holds that the mode-identity depends on a certain unabstractable feature to connect and 
partly  identify  the  modes,  Della  Rocca  defends  a  full,  numeric  identity.  He  states  that  mental 
particulars,  such as the mind,  are identical  with physical  particulars,  such as the body.58 He also 
interprets EIIp7s as stating a numeric identity, i.e., he emphasizes the ''one and the same thing'' in the 
famous scholium, and likewise in EIIIp2s, where Spinoza says:
The mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now 
under the attribute of extension. 
And EIIp21s:
[…] we showed that the idea of the body and the body itself – that is  (Pr. 13, II), mind and body – are one and the  
same individual thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought and now under the attribute of extension. 
Of the above passages Della Rocca draws that is it difficult not to interpret them as committing Spinoza 
to a numerical identity between the mind and the body.  After all, to be one and the same thing is, it  
seems, to be numerically identical.59 Bennett rejects the numerical identity interpretation, presumably 
because of the contradiction it implies in allowance of causal interaction between the mental and the 
physical, and thus violating Spinoza's explicit proposition EIIIp2: The body cannot determine the mind 
to think,  nor can the mind determine the body to motion and rest,  or to anything else (if  there is  
anything else).
Della Rocca denies that the claim that a mode of extension and a mode of thought are numerically 
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identical is incompatible with Spinoza’s causal or explanatory separation between thought and extension. 
Rather he argues, in the defense of his numerical identity interpretation, he claims that it is partly 
because of the explanatory barrier (and not in spite of it) that Spinoza holds the numerical identity view. 
In defending this interpretation Della Rocca relies on what he calls Spinoza’s views on referential 
opacity of certain contexts. This referential opacity is something he draws upon when he rejects 
Bennett’s subtle but wholly unsuccessful interpretation of Spinoza’s view on the mind-body problem.60 
Referential transparency and referential opacity
When contexts are referentially transparent, any way of referring to the same object within the context 
will generate a sentence that has the same truth-value, and the co-referring terms (thought and 
extension) are exchangeable without changing the truth-value. In referential opaque contexts, 
exchanging the terms can change the truth-value of the sentence that completes the context.
Della Rocca bases his example and analysis here on Quine.61  A referentially transparent context would 
be the following:
Let’s say that there is an evil spy at work in John’s neighborhood, and, further, that this spy is John’s brother. In 
such a situation, the following claims are all true:
(1) The spy is a spy.
(2) The spy is John’s brother.
(3) John’s brother is a spy.
Notice that (3) follows from (1) and (2). That is, if (1) and (2) is true, then it must also be the case that (3) is true. 
We can see that for any term “a” that refers to this person, the sentence “is a spy” is true. This shows that the 
context “… is a spy” is referentially transparent: The truth value of the sentence resulting from completing the 
context with a term that refers to a particular object does not depend on what particular term is used to refer to 
that object. In general, a context of the form “… is the G” (or “… is a G”) is referentially transparent if and only 
if an inference of the following is valid:
(4) a is the G
(5) a = b
Therefore, (6) b is the G.62
 
On the other hand, a context is referentially opaque if the truth-value of the sentence completing the 
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context does depend on which particular term is used to refer to that object:
Although John knows there is a spy at work in the neighbourhood, he is completely unaware that his brother is 
the dastardly individual. In this situation it would, of course, be true to say that:
(7) John believes that the spy is a spy.
It would also be true to say that:
(8) The spy is John’s brother.
However, in light of John’s ignorance, it is not the case that:
(9) John believes that John’s brother is a spy.
Claim (9) does not follow from the truth (7) and (8). This shows that whether or not a sentence of the form “John 
believes that … is a spy” is true depends on the particular term used to pick out the individual in question. Thus 
the context “John believes that … is a spy” is referentially opaque if and only if an inference of the form of (4) 
through (6) is invalid. 63
Let’s now turn back to Della Rocca’s rejection of Bennett’s interpretation to see why this is especially 
important. Della Rocca maintains that Bennett’s first mistake is his reluctance to say that the mind is 
numerically identical with the body for Spinoza. This reluctance stems, as previously stated, from 
Bennett’s thinking that if the mind and the body were numerically identical, then the mind, like the body, 
would be conceived through extension.
(10) Mode of extension A causes mode of extension B.
(11) Mode of extension A = Mode of thought 1.
Therefore, (12) Mode of thought 1 causes mode of extension B. 64
And as we already have seen, Bennett stresses Spinoza’s view that no mode of thought can be conceived 
through extension. However, Della Rocca says that this reason for rejecting the numerical identity 
interpretation depends on Bennett’s implicit view that the context “… is conceived through extension” is 
referentially transparent.65 But as Della Rocca argues, Spinoza would hold that this context is not 
transparent, but referentially opaque. He defends this idea by saying that Spinoza considers God to be 
the immanent cause of each finite mode (EIp18) whereas a finite mode would be the transitive cause of 
another finite mode. Spinoza says that whether it is true that God is the cause of a finite mode depends 
on how God is considered. EIIp6 explains:
The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which 
they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute.
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With this Della Rocca suggests that for Spinoza (a) The thinking substance causes mode of thought 1, is 
true, whereas (b) The extended substance causes mode of thought 1, is false: 
The fact that Spinoza sees (a) as true and (b) as false, despite the identity of the thinking substance and the 
extended substance, shows that for Spinoza contexts involving immanent causation are referentially opaque […] 
Thus Spinoza thinks the truth-value of certain immanent causal claims is sensitive to the way in which the 
immanent cause is described.66 
Della Rocca believes that ''what the intellect perceives … as'' in the definition of attribute (EIdef.4) 
points towards opacity. Bennett uses instead this definition to support his thesis that the attributes do 
not really constitute substance although they are perceived of doing so, thus opening up for the trans-
attribute notion. Two important implications if Della Rocca is right in saying that ''… is thinking'' and ''… 
is extended'' are opaque, is that it helps us understand Spinoza's puzzling emphasis on expression and 
conception when he claims that the mind and the body are one and the same thing expressed in two ways 
or conceived in two ways. This is possibly why Spinoza says that my body is a particular thing expressed 
in a certain way rather than simply saying that my body is that thing. Because of the opacity of attribute 
contexts, whether or not it is true to say that a given thing is extended and has the property of being a 
body depends on the terms or concepts used to express that thing. Della Rocca believes that Spinoza is 
signalling this dependence of the property of being a body on the manner of expressing a thing in his 
claim that my body is that thing expressed in a certain way. And the same goes for my mind, and this 
explains why Spinoza does not say it is a certain thing, but a thing expressed in a certain way.67 
 §6:   Substance Monism and Mental Causation
For Spinoza there is only one substance with all possible attributes. While the identity of thinking modes 
and extended modes are clearly suggested in Spinoza's system, it is extremely difficult  to  extract  a 
formal argument for this claim's truth (as we have seen from the respective interpreters above). Unlike, 
for example, Descartes, where mind and body could be conceived separately due to them being two 
separate substances, this is not the case for Spinoza and he argues that both mind and body belong to the 
same  substance  but  are  different  expressions  or  ways  to  conceive  different  attributes  of  this  one 
substance. That is, the two attributes can be conceived independently, the one without the other, but it is 
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not the case that there are two substances or ''different things'' existing separately. 
Before I  account for Spinoza's theory of knowledge I wish to  briefly attend to  my last  point:  Does 
Spinoza succeed in his efforts to show that thought and extension are one and the same thing? 
Spinoza avoided the problems of Descartes' failed interactionism and Leibniz' pre-established harmony. 
But as we have seen, his own parallelism is in no way unproblematic. Some of the responsibility of the 
disagreements can be put on Spinoza's obscure style of writing and argumentation in the Ethics. But the 
problems  philosophers  have  had,  and  still  have,  of  determining  exactly  what  to  make  out  of  his 
argumentation for mind and body being one and the same thing, seen under different attributes, makes it 
tempting to say that Spinoza despite his efforts did not quite effortlessly manage to show that they in fact 
are one and the same thing, or how. However, if we for sake of Spinoza's system accept the premise of 
substance monism and unity, the attributes can show the variety in the universe without jeopardizing this 
unity. If the unity of thought and extension in humans, i.e., body and mind are likewise accepted, we get 
a better gist of how we, according to Spinoza's picture, belong in this universe as necessary modes of 
God or Nature, not a kingdom within a kingdom, but a part of the whole. Then we can see how this  
premise weaves into the big picture, from the modal metaphysics, to the nature of the human mind, and, 
as we shall see, his practical philosophy. 
Another important aspect in this big picture before I attend to the practical and ethical part, is Spinoza's 
theory of knowledge. This I will briefly account for below in §7, before I move on to chapter 3, Ethics 
and Freedom. 
§7:   Knowledge
The fact that the order and connection of our thoughts are causally just as necessary as any physical 
causal chain leads us to Spinoza's theory of knowledge. We saw Curley touch upon them lightly above, 
and there is no doubt  that there is a difference between confused ideas and adequate ideas.  This is 
important for Spinoza not only of pure epistemological reasons, because in knowledge we ought to 
strive  for  true  and  adequate  knowledge,  but  because  of  ethical reasons.  Adequate  ideas  lead  to 
understanding and freedom, whereas confused ideas leads to bondage and suffering. Spinoza explains in 
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EIIp38-45.68
The first and lowest kind of knowledge is imprecise and fragmentary, and Spinoza calls it  opinion  or 
imagination;  haphazard  encounters  in the  external  world,  superficial  sensory data,  imagination  and 
hearsay, this is ''random experience'' and we use different images to form ideas out of scarce building 
material, so to speak. We saw it above in EIIp28; ideas of external object are ideas of modifications of  
our body, which cannot be understood solely through other modifications of our body, but only through 
the modifications of other bodies. Confusing indeed, to say the least. Mixed with prejudice and a number 
of preconceived opinions, the ideas borne out of this are more often than not highly inadequate. Also,  
seeing many things  of  the  same kind,  we start  forming what  Spinoza  calls  universals,  but  I  think 
generalizations fits to the description just as well (e.g., ''cat'', ''dog'', ''man'', ''Jew'', ''Muslim'', ''rock star'').  
Although this sometimes might be helpful, the universal is often vague and general, and does not capture 
the uniqueness of every individual. Hence, universals often obscure what they claim to explain, and 
different people will often have different ideas of universals, a source to many conflicts. In a conflict 
between two inadequate generalizations, even if we ''win'' the argument, we have proven nothing; only 
(often through rhetoric) that one fragment of imagination is superior to another.
The  knowledge of  second kind or  reason is something Spinoza  draws from the  fact  that  we have 
common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. Common notions may sound a lot like 
universals, but they are properties common to things, that they necessary share which is the case since 
everything  is  part  of  the  same  universe.  The  common  notions  do  not  depend  on  universals,  but  
transgress  the  boundaries  we  draw  with  universals  and  ask  what  the  different  individuals  have  in 
common. Since the common notions concern actual properties of things we also move from inadequate 
knowledge  or  opinion to  adequate  knowledge.  In  the  case  of  generalizations,  the  universals  stand 
between us and true knowledge. In the case of common notions we are much more likely to consider the 
object in question in relation to [common notion or property x, y and z] and hence we are more likely to 
reach true conclusions. 
The  third  kind  of  knowledge  is  what  Spinoza  refers  to  as  intuition.  This  is  a  knowledge,  which 
according to Spinoza  proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of  
God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (EIIp40s). We can see this as the parts and the 
whole of nature. We are not only in reason seeing the common notions in things, we fully see their 
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necessity and interconnection, their belonging and their individual essence sub specie aeternitatis,  that 
is, under the light of eternity, ''God's eye'', or, the really big picture of things. Spinoza explains this in 
EVp29s:
We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them as related to a fixed time and place, 
or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Now 
the things that are conceived as true or real in this second way, we conceive under a form of eternity, and their 
ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.  
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Chapter Three: Ethics and Freedom
Spinoza titled his main work Ethika – Ethics – and his goal was to give a geometrical demonstration of 
an ethical doctrine that followed from all the previous propositions as necessary as any other law of 
nature. This is no prescriptive ethics, it is a more descriptive one, but as we will see, Spinoza also offers 
''oughts''. However, for Spinoza the primary ethical problem we need to solve is that we are in bondage. 
Here it is appropriate  to  wonder,  has not  Spinoza himself asserted human bondage by proposing a 
metaphysical framework based on the necessity of all things? How is freedom compatible with Spinoza's 
philosophical system? This shows clearly Spinoza's compatibilist views: he asserts strict determinism, 
and at the same time he asserts human freedom. But this freedom will emerge only when we understand 
the necessary causes of things – you are free when you understand determinism and the eternal laws. A 
part of being in bondage is caused by the illusion that we ourselves can be our own legislator, and that 
we pick freely between alternatives. Throughout his writings Spinoza makes no distinction between the 
various phenomena he is explaining, whether it is laws of nature or psychology. He treats and discusses 
both in the same way. The consequence is that he considers the human mind and emotions as if they 
were  lines, planes or bodies  (EIII preface). Emotions follow from causes with the same necessity as 
everything else does, and can thus be understood inadequately or adequately. When they are understood 
adequately we regain some intellectual control over them.
A few words on some different conceptions of freedom can be enlightening here. Freedom has occupied 
thinkers through the history of philosophy and is still a much debated topic. Freedom is something that 
has been considered not only in philosophy, but also in areas of political theory, legislation, articulation 
of human rights.  &c. Positive and negative freedom are important  concepts in these areas.  Positive 
freedom is characterized as 'the freedom to'  or  'the right to'.  This may include propositions like the 
freedom to life, liberty and safety, freedom to speak, freedom to be recognized without discrimination 
before  the law,  freedom to  necessary medical care,  freedom to  own property,  freedom to  thought,  
conscience and religion. Similarly, negative freedom is 'freedom from', like freedom from torture, slavery 
and  inhuman treatment,  freedom from prosecution  based  on  race,  religion,  sexual  orientation,  &c, 
freedom from arbitrary arrest, and so on.  
Sometimes the  positive and negative freedom can be incompatible.  E.g.  can one person’s  negative 
freedom from being in arrest or detention harm other people’s positive freedom to public safety. Spinoza 
47
establishes the positive freedom to philosophize in the Theological-Political Treatise69. In the same place 
Spinoza confirms nature's  sovereign right  to  do all  that  she can do;  that  is,  Nature's  right  is  co-
extensive with her power. I have already said that for Spinoza, rights, or freedom, and power is one and 
the same thing. Inadequate understanding of this particular conception of freedom can easily lead to 
misunderstandings:  in a  world  where  freedom is power,  how can there  be  unforfeitable  rights  for 
everybody? I will return to this question in §9.
Freedom is  further  connected  with  normativity.  Norms are  propositions  with  practical  and  action-
oriented import, and they imply ought-type statements or assertions. However, every ought imply can.  
We do not say ''that  brick ought to  apologize'',  ''that  infant ought to  stop crying and clean up after  
himself'',  or  ''that  tiger  ought  to  eat  carrots  instead  of  wild boars''.  But  when we say that  grown, 
functioning humans are free, that implies that we conceive as possible the act of choosing to do a certain 
action or refrain from it, and when we say that the will is free, it means the same thing, that a person 
can, wilfully and consciously,  choose  to  do either this or that action. This is not right, according to 
Spinoza. Our wills are not immune to the wholly determined nature they are modes in. However, we will 
see that this is nevertheless compatible with freedom and responsibility. 
Negative freedom is largely freedom from external and internal restraints. But we are constantly being 
acted  upon  and  affected  by external  causes,  and  we  are  overwhelmed  by our  own  appetites  and 
emotions, and act from this. In this causal climate, being unaffected is not an option for Spinoza (e.g.  
Ep. 21: our freedom lies not in.. indifference, but in the mode of affirmation and denial, so that the less  
indifference  there  is...  the  more  we are  free.).  Hence,  we  should  ideally  get  to  know  the  causal 
mechanism of external and internal affections intimately, in that way we replace passitivity of mind with 
activity of mind (reason). Spinoza does firmly believe that we with activity of mind can replace passive 
affects with active affects and be ''our own causes'' i.e. determine ourselves. Adequate understanding is 
key here, we need to understand necessary causes and effects, both external and internal. As I wrote 
above in §2, according to Spinoza we imagine we have free will because we are aware of our wantings 
and desires, but not of the causes of these. When we fail to accomplish something desired, we often 
despair and become unhappy, blame others or our own weakness of will. Spinoza wants to break the 
traditional link between freedom and will,  and rather  connect  our  wantings to  the  modal necessity 
explained in chapter one. Deleuze writes:
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Necessity being the only modality of all that is, the only cause that can be called free is one ''that exists through 
the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined by itself alone to act.'' Thus God, who is constituted by infinity 
of attributes, is the cause of all things in the same sense that he is cause of himself. God is free because everything 
follows necessarily from his essence, without his conceiving possibilities or contingencies. What defines freedom 
is an ''interior'' and a ''self'' determined by necessity. One is never free through one's will and through that, on 
which it patterns itself, but through one's essence and through that which follows from it.70  
Here we see the close connection of the ontological propositions of necessity and freedom. Spinoza's 
ethics is not a moral science, but a practical philosophy of how to live well through understanding and 
reconciliation with a determined ontology. 
Spinoza attends to the nature and origin of the emotions in part III, and human bondage, or the strength 
of the emotions in part IV. In this chapter I will explain what ethics is for Spinoza, and how it is related 
to the topics of previous chapters of this paper. I will do this in light of how Spinoza sees the human 
emotions in §8. In §9 I will pick up the concept of conatus and show how it relates to freedom and self-
subsistence.  The conclusions will tell us something about  Spinoza's notion of will. In §10 questions 
about virtue arise, and I will show that although Spinoza does not fit into the traditional conception of 
vices and virtues given in prescriptive ethics, and despite his rejection of free will, his concept of virtue 
is an important  contribution to  ethical discourse and still highly relevant  today.  This explication of 
Spinoza's views on ethics, striving and virtue will be a helpful step towards the final chapter, where I aim 
to show the practical implications of Spinoza's ethics.
§8: What is Spinozistic Ethics?
Curley writes in his postscript to Spinoza's Metaphysics that his account for Spinoza tends to suggest 
that he was primarily a metaphysician with an interest in philosophy of science, whose views happened 
to have consequences for ethics, whereas Spinoza's writings and the title of his major works suggest 
rather that his concern with ethics was primary and his interest in metaphysics secondary. To ignore the 
moral convictions that underlay the metaphysics is to leave out of  account what mattered most to  
Spinoza.71 The metaphysics and the ethics are two aspects of one and the same thing for Spinoza. To 
understand  the  whole  universe,  as  far  as  we  can,  and  acquire  adequate  knowledge  is  crucial  to 
understand  the  parts,  or  the  modes  of  it,  and  thereby ourselves  and  our  own  understanding  and 
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emotions. Understanding our passions and affects will, according to Spinoza, necessarily help us turn 
into adequate causes, where we can be able to free ourselves from bondage and act according to our 
nature. I wrote above in §2 about ''leeway'', in which all truths are necessary, but not necessarily in the 
same sense. For Spinoza perfection or reality (which is the same thing for Spinoza, by EII def 6) is a  
matter of degrees, it can be seen several places in his writings.72 We should briefly note how Spinoza, as 
an early modernist, used the term reality:
Spinoza's conception of reality or of real things contains a number of basic, more or less Aristotelian intuitions 
that, combined with typical Spinozistic insights, are transformed into a revolutionary worldview. These intuitions 
are: first, that nothing can be real unless it is a ''so and so'' – that is, unless it has a certain particular nature or 
essence; second, that the degree of reality depends on the ''richness'' of the nature of the thing; third, that a real 
thing is prototypically a substance or something that ''is in itself'' and that is the basis of ''affections'' that are ''in 
another'' (Spinoza call these ''modes''); and, fourth, that a thing cannot be real (''werk-elijk'' in Dutch) unless it is 
working, unless it is a power actively producing ''effects''.73
In other words, Spinoza uses reality as a kind of ''property'' that a thing can have. Properties can be more 
or less ''present'', i.e. working or functioning. A perfect thing, which Spinoza equates with most reality, is 
thus a thing lacking nothing in essence; it achieves it purpose, fulfils its functions.
The point here is, that this indicates that Spinoza holds open the possibility of change, that something 
belongs to our essence and we can move from less reality to more, we can increase in perfection; change 
to become freer and happier, and that we as external causes have the power to be adequate causes in the  
world. I will now attend to Spinoza's theory of emotions before saying more about this, and about how 
increasing degrees of understanding and rationality is vital to ethics in spinozistic context.
Emotions
By Emotion  [affectus] Spinoza understands  the affections of the body by which the body's power of  
activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections. He 
adds that  if we can be adequate  cause of one of these affections,  then by emotion he understands 
activity, otherwise passivity (EIIIdef.3).  When we are not able to  control and restrain the emotions, 
Spinoza says we are in bondage: 
For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies 
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that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse (EIV preface).
Spinoza  says  there  are  three  primary  kinds  of  affect  –  Leticia,  i.e.  pleasure  or  joy,  tristitia,  i.e. 
displeasure,  pain or  sadness.  The  third  is  cupiditas,  i.e. desire  or  appetite.  All the  other  emotions 
Spinoza  lists  are  subspecies.  The  first  two  jointly  comprise  the  emotional  affects,  the  ones  that 
essentially include a component of feeling. The third one, desire, I will treat separately in §10 conatus.
A word on the translation: I have in different texts seen laetitia and tristitia translated as all the terms I 
use above, and although we can easily understand that what Spinoza aims to do is to contrast pleasant 
and unpleasant states of mind (and body), I agree with Bennett that 'joy' and 'sorrow' are to specific, and 
that the German translation of lust and unjust74 are more covering. I will therefore, following Bennett, 
use pleasure and unpleasure75 henceforward. 
The pleasant and unpleasant states of mind are what change us to a greater or lesser perfection or reality 
according to Spinoza. More reality or perfection means more power to act and that leads us to a greater  
degree  of  vitality  and  self-sufficiency.  Pleasure  and  unpleasure  are  passages  from  lesser  to 
greater/greater to lesser perfection. Spinoza explains:
2. Pleasure is man's transition from a state of less perfection to a state of less perfection.
3. Pain [unpleasure] is man's transition from a state of greater perfection to lesser perfection.
Explication: I say ''transition'' for pleasure is not perfection itself. If a man were to be born with the perfection to 
which he passes, he would be in possession of it without the emotion of pleasure. This is clearer in the case of 
pain [unpleasure], the contrary emotion. For nobody can deny that pain consists in the transition to a state of less 
perfection, not in the less perfection itself, since man cannot feel pain insofar as he participates in any degree of 
perfection (EIII Definitions of the Emotions).  
Spinoza traces all emotions back to the primary three of pleasure, unpleasure and desire. Love and hate 
are  respectively defined as  pleasure  accompanied  by the  idea  of  an external cause  and unpleasure 
accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an  external  cause.  Among  other  emotions  Spinoza  define  as  being 
accompanied by the idea of an external thing are contempt, aversion, devotion, derision, hope and fear, 
confidence  and  despair,  pity,  envy and  compassion.  Among  the  emotions  Spinoza  lists  which  are 
accompanied by an internal thing as cause follows self-contentment, humility, repentance, pride, self-
abasement, honour and shame. The emotions Spinoza link to desire is among others longing, gratitude 
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and benevolence, anger, revenge and cruelty, timidity, politeness and ambition. 
Spinoza makes as we have seen (EIIIdef.3) a distinction between passive and active emotions. Active 
emotions are to be preferred because they involve activity of mind, reason. The preceding definitions are 
helpful:
(1) I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through the said cause. I call that  
an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood through the said cause alone.
(2) I say that we are active when something takes place, in us or externally to us, of which we are the adequate cause;  
that is, (by preceding Def.), when from our nature there follows in us or externally to us something which can be 
clearly and distinctly understood through our nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are passive when  
something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause.
The distinction is, I  think, similar to  the one Spinoza makes between  perception  and  conception  in 
EIIdef3exp: I say ''conception'' rather that ''perception'' because the term perception seems to indicate  
that the mind is passive to its object whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind. It is 
as if Spinoza wants to say that a passive perception – or a passive emotion – is something that ''hits''  
you, you are not the cause of it, whereas a conception - or an active emotion – involves a contemplative 
aspect, reason is involved and you are the cause of it. Humans are true to their own nature when they 
are being reasonable; we are after  all a  rational animal.  Cognition,  causation and action are tightly 
connected in Spinoza's system. And his ethics is all about pursuing our nature of being able to  act,  
instead of just being acted upon. Included in this is a becoming of who we are. When we are in bondage  
under passive emotions, we do not completely understand, and in the same way as inadequate ideas 
breed other inadequate ideas, a chain reaction of passive emotions occur. Fear leads to  anger, anger  
leads to hate, hate leads to suffering. A man can hate his enemies, but his hate doesn't hurt them, rather it 
makes the hating man's days into a hellish turmoil. That is, he is in bondage.
What would Spinoza have the man do, then? Perhaps his anger is justified, perhaps he is entitled to at 
least some indignation or contempt. This leads us to active emotions. Although he says in EVp2 that if 
we remove an emotion from the idea of its external cause, then love and hatred toward the external 
cause, and also vacillations, that arise from these emotions will be destroyed, I do not think this means 
that Spinoza is aiming to annihilate every trace of human emotional life. What he says it that we should 
turn the passive emotions into active ones. According to EVp3, a passive emotion ceases to be a passive 
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emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. In the scholium to EVp4 Spinoza says that  
since from all things an effect follows (EIp36), and that all that follows from an idea that is adequate  
in us is understood by us clearly and distinctly (EIIp40), he infers that everyone has the capacity to 
clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions. If not absolutely, at  least  in part,  and 
consequently he is less passive in respect of them. 
So we should pay particular attention to getting to know each emotion, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, so  
that  the mind may thus be determined from the emotion to think those things that  it  clearly and distinctly  
perceives, and in which it finds full contentment. Thus the emotion may be detached from the thought of an  
external cause and joined to true thoughts (EVp4Sch).
This step on ''the path of wisdom'' that Spinoza points out is an active project of a lifetime. To meditate  
over  the  nature  of  our  emotions  and their  interlinking with causes  and other  thoughts  rather  than 
succumb to or repress them is a key element in Spinoza's ethics.  It also indicates one of the reasons why 
Spinoza has been linked to Buddha76, and how Spinoza's ethics may be seen as an inspiration to what 
animated psychoanalysis, that knowledge of causes of emotional states can be therapeutical77.
We have to acquire a new way of seeing things, but no matter how powerful we are, it is always possible 
to be overpowered (EIVax1). When we are the adequate cause of something, when we act, it means that 
at the moment we are not overpowered by some other effect. I can act before I cross the street by 
consciously looking to my right and to my left. If a bus hits me I will still be overpowered, but my act 
will reduce the chance for it. To look carefully before I cross the street is one of my acquired habits. Of 
course that particular habit may be due to my striving to preserve my life, which is a part of my nature,  
but in the same way we can acquire the habit of attempting to  strive towards knowledge, or avoid 
wrongdoing, not out of fear of punishment (passive emotions), but as an active, integrated part of our 
nature: I refrain, or try to refrain, from such behaviour because it is directly opposed to my particular  
nature, and would cause me to stray from the love and knowledge of God (Ep. 21). This nature is not 
fatalistically set in stone, we have to start at some point, and we can make the love to knowledge and 
reason to an integrated part of our nature. Naess writes:
Thus, even though human beings start low on their road to freedom, as slaves of passive emotions, they have 
necessary causal and cognitive endowment to crawl upwards. There are no emotions (according to 5P4Cor) from 
which we cannot form an adequate idea. And they can all develop into active emotions.78
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Discussion of problematic features in Spinoza's ethical model
However, Spinoza's therapeutic methods to the blissful state of Zen are not wholly unproblematic. He 
acknowledges himself that it is not easy (''All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare'' in his 
closing sentence in the Ethics), but for our purpose it is important to discuss the argumentation of his 
proposals. Intuitively it is easy to be swept away with Spinoza's notion that when we get more complete 
understanding of something, overwhelming feelings loose their power over us. We recognize it from our 
experience, at least in not too complicated instances. Adkins illustrates with an anecdote. He is driving 
courteously and mindfully in his little compact car, when a speeding SUV driver cuts him of. He slams 
on the brakes to avoid a collision, but the driver in the SUV never deviates or slows down. Adkins is 
livid and with good reason. The other driver endangered him, and showed a total lack of decent traffic 
behaviour. However, while our man is gazing wrathfully at the rear end of the SUV, it takes a turn by the 
street to the hospital parking lot and pulls up in front of the emergency room doors. The driver gets out,  
runs to the other side of the SUV to open the door, and helps out a very pregnant woman. The anger so  
very present just a moment ago ceased, and he observes in himself: the lack of anger at this point seems  
remarkable.79
This sort of experiences we can recognize, but at the same time, can't it just be happenstance? What if 
Adkins did not see the driver pull in to the hospital? What if the SUV driver really is a thoughtless and  
incompetent driver even without a labouring woman as a passenger? Would the anger be justified then? 
We do know that in some instances, a least, our anger dissipates when we get more information about  
causes and understand a given situation better, But we have to look a bit closer on Spinoza to see if this  
model can (1) be generally applicable. Also, it is worth asking (2) how the mental property reason can 
dictate,  or be causally relevant,  not only in respect to  our emotions but also to  bodily behaviour,  a 
property of extension. 
I will briefly attend to the latter problem first. Spinoza aims fire at Descartes and the stoics in the preface 
to EV, complaining over their account of the intellects power over the emotions. But he himself says 
that the reason can dictate the emotions, so what is the difference? Spinoza's main objection is that of 
the free will of the mind in control. That implies that if you fail you are to blame for a moral defect or  
lack of willpower. Since Spinoza equates the will and the intellect (see §9), if you fail, he attributes that  
to error or inadequate knowledge. Descartes' notion of the mind acting on the animal spirits which in 
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turn influence the  emotions80,  is also something Spinoza cannot  accept  being a  form of  interaction 
between the mental and the physical. However, Spinoza's criticism is not that Descartes and the stoics 
exaggerate the mind's power over the emotions. Rather, his main charge, Bennett suggest, is that:
they are wrong about what it is for anything to have a power. Rather than holding that the mind can control its 
owner's emotions  by virtue of its own structure and the laws it obeys,  while  it is healthy and energetic,  to the  
extent that it is well disciplined, and so on, they hold that the mind has its controlling powers without conditions. 
Has it 'absolutely', has it, period.81 
That kind of absolute power that comes from nowhere is something Spinoza has to reject because he 
needs an explanation for everything, and for him, the mind and willpowers depend on how they fit into 
the causal scheme of everything. A powerful mind is caused to be powerful, and he writes in EV preface 
that  much practice and application are required to restrain and moderate the affects.  That there is a 
way and means to get leverage on the affects does not, according to  Bennett,  betray the parallelism 
thesis.  Affects are introduced as psychophysical episodes or dispositions, and Spinoza is free to say  
that therapy under one attribute has its automatic counterpart under the other.82
The first proposition of part V is virtually a repetition of EIIp7; Spinoza says that the affections of the 
body are arranged and connected in the same way as thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and 
connected in the mind. He uses this to proof Evp10, which says that as long as we are not assailed by  
emotions that are contrary to our nature, we have the power to arrange and associate affections of the  
body according to the order of the intellect. This shows the mind-body union, and I take to mean that if 
Spinoza's  medicine  is  right,  and  we  with  the  help  of  reason  reflect  adequately on  distracting  and 
obsessive thoughts and get good mental health, the body's health will naturally follow, and we are less 
prone to stress-induced high blood pressure, heart disease, neck and back pains, ulcers, &c. 
The fact is that we know really very little about psychology and the brain. Not everyone would agree  
with this, but if we say that a mental thought-shift causes (or is parallel accompanied by) some firing of 
some neuron in the brain,  we can see that  we both mentally an physically goes through a change. 
However, we are not scientifically able to go in and cause that particular firing in the brain yet, or at  
least safely. Spinoza  focuses on the change caused by mental thought-shifts and beliefs, and these must 
be applied and practiced to be integrated. It is in this process he means that we turn passive emotions to 
active ones, but his argumentation is not flawless.
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Regarding (1), the general applicability of Spinoza's model of turning passive emotions into active ones, 
we have to  look at  Spinoza's argumentation. I follow Bennett  in saying that Spinoza's method is to  
separate emotions from thoughts, to  turn passions into actions and to  reflect  on determinism. I will 
discuss these in the same order.
The method of separation
If we hate someone, it is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Then, we by EVp2, 
have to separate the emotion from the idea of an external cause, and join it to other thoughts. This is  
problematic. All that follows is that if I e.g. disconnect my unpleasure from the idea that you caused it, 
then good for you, I no longer hate you, but this only means that my unpleasure no longer qualifies as  
hate: the unpleasure might nevertheless still eat me up. If this argumentation should be valid it would 
have to be the thought of an external cause per se that caused the unpleasure. 
Also, if I my bad feelings towards you are caused by my belief that you did something horrid, the bad 
feelings would be abolished by removing that belief. But, as Bennett points out: 
many harmful emotions would indeed disappear if we were to rid ourselves of the beliefs on which they rest!  
Unfortunately, sure-fire techniques are usually hard to apply. This one is inapplicable because, as Spinoza knows, 
belief is not under the command of the will.83
Through practice one can practice putting unpleasurable thoughts away, ignore them or do something 
pleasurable  instead.  However,  this  sound a  lot  like repression  to  me,  and sweeping uncomfortable 
thoughts under the rug is not a permanently good solution. Spinoza encourages us to  meet hate, and 
meditate  frequently over the common wrongs of men, and meet  them with love and nobility in the 
appendix of EIV.
As a therapeutic tool I think all Spinoza want to say was that horrible things happen to us all the time, 
but when it first have happened, bearing a grudge towards the malefactor will not add anything good to 
it. Not bearing a grudge or hate or disappear in red anger is beneficial for each and every ones peace of 
mind, and is not the same as letting evildoers ''off the hook''. Spinoza writes in EIVp63s. that the judge 
who condemns a man to death not through hatred or anger but solely through love of public welfare is  
guided  by  reason.  Death  penalty  aside,  in  a  just  court  only  reason  shall  prevail,  not  emotional 
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distractions.
The method of turning
Turning passions into actions is something Spinoza holds we can do when we form an adequate idea of 
the passion. As I wrote above, EVp3, reads a passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon  
as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. Adequate ideas are as we know caused from within, and that 
makes it an action, not a passion. Its bodily counterpart will also be an action. And, as we also saw 
above, according to Spinoza by EVp4 there is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear  
and distinct conception. Bennett criticizes Spinoza's move here as nonsense, for no one could possibly 
acquire an adequate idea of an event after is has occurred.84 By simply understanding the causes of why 
x occurred, I cannot make it an action of mine. That is, after an event has occurred, it cannot be caused 
from within, from me. The problem is that Spinoza's claim is too strong. By turning passion into action, 
the way he describes it, he is implicitly saying that we can change the cause of an event. It doesn't seem 
right, or extremely peculiar at least. 
But what if Spinoza means that in an ongoing processes, causes could be altered along the way. Bennett 
suggests this, but concludes that he cannot imagine what it would be like to  alter the causes of an  
ongoing emotional process85.  The problem is also there if Spinoza meant that as a defence-mechanism 
for future troublesome situations, we should know the different emotions beforehand, as indicated by 
EV4s, because if we do know each emotion, as far as possible, clearly and distinctly, our mind will be 
determined away from the passion and towards what it clearly and distinctively perceives. That is, when 
our emotions are as active as we can make them, we are less likely to be acted upon.  When external 
causes threaten us, then, we are already active by virtue of knowing how the situation may affect our  
emotions. This explanation is thin, but this ''turning-technique'' of Spinoza's is hard to defend. Bennett  
grants Spinoza the view that: 
I conjecture that what he had in mind in offering p3,4 was not nonsense, but rather the view that sufferings can 
sometime be somewhat lessened by an understanding of their causes. That is all right as a bit of worldly wisdom,  
but p3d is irrelevant to it. Suppose that some episode x occurs in my body, and was caused by an external event y. 
If I inquire into the causes of x, and am successful, I shall acquire ideas of y. But those ideas willnot include I(y) –  
the idea directly of y, its 2p7 counterpart – but only ideas indirectly of it. So the cause of I(x), namely I(y), will 
continue to be outside my mind; so I(x) will remain inadequate and x will remain a passion.86  
I agree with Bennett that this is a problem for Spinoza. Even if we understand that something (y) caused 
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a certain state (x) in us, no matter how we look at it, the former cause (y) cannot change into an action  
of ours. Unfortunately, it seems like that is what Spinoza is saying, because understanding something 
adequately  is  the  same as  causing it  from within.  I  can never  get  the  complete,  adequate  idea of 
something caused externally. 
How then, can we be causes of our own states? I have a suggestion, based on Naess' hypothesis of 
cognitive-causal parallelism.  Also,  even though we should  keep in mind that  Spinoza's  seventeenth 
century use of the Latin causa is not like every modern use of 'cause'87, I am using the notion of pre-
emptive causation, as explained below. Keeping Bennett's x as an episode or state in my body, and y as 
the cause, my suggestion would then be, that if and only if x can be conceived through y, is y the cause 
of x, and if and only if y is the cause of x, can x be conceived through y.88 Simply put: Iff my hate can be 
conceived trough something you did, then the thing you did is the cause of my hate, and iff the thing you 
did is the cause of my hate, then my hate can be conceived through the thing you did. Now assume that  
you did something horrible to me, but I am set on not letting you ruin my peaceful state of mind, and I  
know that by EIII definition of the emotions 7, hatred is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an 
external cause, but this is passive and confused, by EVp3. If you want to inflict pain on me, I cannot 
certainly prevent it, but say that I through meditation had studied the emotion of hatred and found it is 
mostly useless and unpleasant, and I am determined to keep calm and avoid unpleasure. If I succeed in 
this,  instead  of  feeling  x,  hatred, I  feel,  say,  z,  self-contentment,  pleasure  arising  from  a  man's  
contemplation of himself and power of activity (EIII def. Of emotions, 26). Then instead of you with 
your action, y, causing my present state of mind, I am causing it myself. I ''cancel out'' y as the cause and 
''inserts'' a particular instance of understanding my emotion of hatred, r1. Then we have: iff z can be 
conceived through r1, is r1 the cause of z, and iff r1 is cause of z, can z be conceived through r1.
This is an instance, or act of pre-emptive causation, where two sufficient causes occur, where one is the 
cause and the other is merely a pre-empted potential cause:
Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy throws first so that her rock arrives first and shatters the glass.  
Without Suzy's throw, Billy's throw would have shattered the bottle. However, Suzy's throw is the actual cause of 
the shattered bottle, while Billy's throw is merely a pre-empted potential cause. This is a case of late pre-emption 
because the alternative process (Billy's throw) is cut short after the main process (Suzy's throw) has actually  
brought about the effect.89
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This fits with what Spinoza says in EIVax that there is no individual thing in nature than which there is 
not another more powerful and stronger. When r1 caused state of mind z, and prevented y from causing 
state of mind x, r1 was more powerful than y. If my particular act of reflection r1 had not occurred, y 
would have caused x.  I  would have been overpowered by hatred,  and this force of passion would 
prevented my actions from being my own, they would in a way be yours, since my hatred could only be 
conceived through the external cause inflicted on me by you. Active thinking was in this case more 
powerful than my passion, and it prevailed. I find Bennett's advice to settle with a humbler conclusion – 
namely, the observation that knowledge of causes sometimes has healing power90 to be a insufficient 
advice in this case, where we can do concideably better in our efforts both to  understand Spinoza's 
method and our own resources. 
The method of reflecting of determinism
Spinoza's proposition EV6 is Insofar as the mind understands all things as governed by necessity, to  
that extent it has greater power over emotions, i.e. it is less passive in respect of them tells us that to 
that degree we understand that everything that happens is part of a necessary whole, we will not fall 
victim to unnecessary emotional turmoil and passive speculation of the kind ''why, oh why'', ''if I only 
had...'' &c. In the appendix to EI, Spinoza is criticising the notion of final causes (which I will discuss in 
§9) by saying that the people that argue for final causes - if a man dies because a stone hits him in the 
head - they will say that the stone fell in order to kill the man. In Spinoza's criticism here, we also see 
how understanding necessary cause-effect can explain the event. The stone fell because the wind was 
blowing, the wind was blowing because a current of air was moving from a high-pressure area to a low-
pressure area, and this was because of the weather the preceding days. The man was walking that way 
because a friend invited him. Questions like 'why was the man invited at that particular time', and 'why 
was the wind so strong', have natural cause-effect answers. Of course it was unfortunate that the man 
was ''at the wrong place to the wrong time'', but Spinoza's idea is that when we see how it all can be  
explained, our passions will not be so strong. The pointless answer ''it was his destiny'' makes us despair 
and angry, whereas it is more difficult to be angry at the weather. 
But again, there is no guarantee that seeing how our unpleasant states arise from necessity will diminish 
our unpleasant feelings towards it. This is a good point:
If we are lavishly indulgent towards the sequence 3p48-49-5p5 we may credit it with showing that my belief that 
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Peter was caused to act as he did will lessen the intensity of my emotion towards him, but we cannot extract the 
further conclusion that I shall then be in a less intense and upsetting emotional state altogether. 91
Spinoza thinks that  our  greatest  affects  are  toward  things we imagine as free (EIIIp49;  Evp5).  As 
discussed  above,  when we say something acts  freely,  we assume they could also  act  otherwise.  If 
somebody we love abandons us, it is harder to come to terms with being left by choice than by necessity. 
The idea is that the understanding of some events includes the reconciling knowledge of the necessity of 
the infinite chain of finite causes. Bennett claims that Spinoza's argumentation concerns redistribution of 
emotions over a wider range of objects. He mentions a possibility, which he himself does not endorse, 
but there is a gap in Spinoza's argument and this can be driven through:
When I think of Peter deterministically, much of my hate is redirected towards his ancestors and schoolteachers; I  
have as great a total amount of hate as before, and now it is harder to control because it is wide ranging and  
unfocussed.92 
 
I agree with Bennett that this is not how hate works. However, it is important to consider because it 
indicates the possibility of a reason for believing in the benefits of e.g. rehabilitation in prisons, a better  
safety net in different social services, better follow-up of weaker school pupils. In an infinite chain of 
finite causes, we understand how single individuals turn out based on infinitely many variables. Some are 
given by nature; like their genetic make-up, height, shoe size, eye colour, lactose intolerance or Leaden 
factor  V.  Other  qualities are  acquired throughout  life.  Some unconsciously,  like body language and 
posture, humour, eating habits and certain values. These unconsciously acquired qualities can however 
be  conscious  manipulated.  We  also  acquire  some  properties  consciously,  like  learning  to  play  an 
instrument. All these genetic and practical areas determine the course in people’s lives. If evildoing were 
solely the result of bad character and an urge to use ones free will to do devilry, intervention in finite  
causes would be of little matter. It would be of no use to give education in prisons or protect children 
from abuse. But considering the practical aspect of Spinoza's philosophy, I think this is relevant to take 
into the equation, because we do know empirically that a conscious change of acquired tendencies can 
be positive.
If Peter performs an abominable crime, we instinctively have an intuition that he should be held morally 
responsible. This intuition is rooted in our belief in free will. ''Peter chose to do the crime''. If we learned 
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that Peter had a brain tumour explaining his violent behaviour, or learned that he had been repeatedly 
raped as a child, we start thinking differently and more in term of prior causes. But yet again, this is not 
to say that the determinist thoughts quell all unpleasant affects in us.
Bennett makes an interesting consideration about how reflecting on determinism can lessen unpleasant 
emotions, which he borrows from Strawson. Given something occurs which is welcome or unwelcome, 
one may respond with one of two attitudes:
(a) I  may adopt the 'objective attitude'  of one who wants to understand what happened – to know what the  
mechanisms were – so as to raise or lower the chances of its happening again. (b) I may adopt a 'reactive attitude' 
such as gratitude or resentment. […] For most of us, there seems to be an incompatibility between the two: while I  
am in a prudently inquiring frame of mind about your benefit or harm to me, I cannot also feel true gratitude or 
resentment in respect of it. […] What we have here, I suggest, are not logical conflicts between propositions, but 
an  incompatibility  between  two  frames  of  mind  –  the  reactive  frame  which  begets  thoughts  of  moral  
accountability etc., and the objective one which generates questions about whether and how the action was  
caused. If this is right, then the mere truth of determinism is no challenge to our continued use of praise and  
blame. Whether we should retain praise and blame is a practical question – more like 'Should we continue with 
chamber music?' than like 'Should we retain quantum theory?' Like Strawson, I want to retain at  least some  
reactive attitudes because I think that the prospect of being without them is horrid. To welcome this part of our 
natures, rather than trying to suppress it, is to choose to retain a degree of impulsive uncalculated response to one 
another; it is to refuse always to act and feel in the light of a considered view of the facts. 93  
It is simply very difficult to combine the two frames of mind. Spinoza wants us in the objective frame of 
mind, and that can certainly be a good place to be in many situations. But neither Strawson nor Bennett 
wants to give up the reactive frame completely. According to Strawson, praise and blame are rooted in 
feelings  of  moral  approval  or  indignation,  which  in  turn  are  vicarious  analogues  of  gratitude  and 
resentment.94 Evolutionary speaking we have reason to  believe that  kindness and co-operation have 
played an important role in human development. We possess an innate sensitivity to the emotional status 
of other members of our species. These reactive attitudes are not something we can just discard. And 
indeed we should not, according to some moral philosophers. Sentimentalist Slote argues that empathy 
is the cement of the moral universe.95 This is an interesting notion, and I will consider it in my section on 
what it means to live ethically for Spinoza
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Living ethically for Spinoza is living according to ones nature
From what we have seen above it becomes clearer that Spinoza's ethics can be said to  be a sort  of 
ethology. Our endeavour to act as powerful, self-sufficient causes, determine ourselves from our essence 
is living ethically for Spinoza. As I said in the introduction, (God's or) Nature's perfection lies in the 
necessary expression of its essence. Nature follows its nature and cannot do otherwise. The human goal 
is to strive for the same thing, and to acquire 'a more perfect state' through doing what harmonizes best  
with our  nature and inclinations.  We ought  to  strive to  do what  composes well with our  nature or  
essence, and that is virtue itself, says Spinoza. He also says in EVp25 that the highest striving of the 
mind is  to  understand  things  by the  third  kind  of  knowledge,  the  knowledge  that  proceeds  from 
adequate knowledge of certain of God's attributes to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things:
Therefore (Pr. 28, IV), the highest virtue of the mind, that is (Def. 8, IV), its power or nature, or its highest conatus (Pr. 7,  
III), is to understand things by this third kind of knowledge.  
This is highly intellectualistic, and seems exceedingly difficult to  reach. Are we to settle with ''all or  
nothing'' in the area of living ethically according to Spinoza? I say no. Spinoza does not pretend to hide 
that the proportion of people achieving that kind of enlightenment is a fraction in relation to the whole 
of humanity. But living morally decent lives is not reserved for the few, neither did Spinoza think so. I  
suggest that we can understand Spinoza and the path he is proposing towards wisdom better if we 
consider it as something evolving through the three following steps: From the basic empathy – through 
normativity – to the mature conception of freedom as Spinoza saw it. 
Whether or not Slote is right in saying that empathy is the cement of our moral universe, it is something 
every single person is born with (for brevity I do not consider extreme psychopahts/people with severe 
personality disorders), and it influences human action regardless of adequate ideas or not. Even if people 
are driven by passions, and think the earth is flat and the moon is a ten pound German trappistenkäse, 
they have empathy, with the morally corrective nature that follows, and this takes the form of aversion 
or approval. This is primal, immediate reactions we feel in our inner core upon watching some actions; 
we feel pleasure and joy upon witnessing compassion, we feel unpleasure and disgust upon watching 
cruelty. Bennett said the prospect of being without reactive attitudes is horrid, and I agree. 
Unfortunately, empathy is also partialistic:
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We normally feel more empathic concern for potential or actual harm or pain that we notice in our vicinity than 
for what we merely know about or have heard of, and when we hear of a contemporaneous threat to human life 
(say, if coal miners are trapped underground), our empathy is more sharply aroused than if a (n even larger scale) 
threat arises concerning future loss of life. […] We tend to feel more empathic concern when threats or sufferings 
are spatially and temporally nearer.96
Even if natural empathy can be corrective, it is also inadequate. Some thousand years ago empathy did 
not need to go beyond our own tribe and possibly the ones surrounding our own. Today the world looks 
drastically different. Our actions not only have consequences for ourselves, but also for people in other 
countries, on other continents, and likely for future generations; people we have never met, and never 
will  meet.  That  makes  it  tempting  to  prescribe  some normative  ethics  offering  overarching  moral 
principles to follow even when we stand before decisions in areas that goes far beyond our empathic 
scope. Normative ethics prescribes a particular way of life that we ought to  do good, and ought to  
refrain from doing bad. Depending on the ethical theory one prefers, numerous reasons will be given as 
to why. This may be the desire to pursue the greatest good, or whether or not the principle one is acting 
on entails a contradiction. Spinoza's ethics is descriptive, and as I will show in §10 he rejects moral 
judgements,  because what  we call ''good''  and ''evil'' or  ''bad'',  are according to  Spinoza merely our 
evaluations, and have no truth-value in themselves, i.e. ''good'' and ''evil'' are not properties belonging to 
a given thing or action, for Spinoza what determines if something is good or bad is how it affects us in 
any given situation. Nevertheless Spinoza does aknowledge the use of some prescriptions:
Spinoza does accord a kind of provisional value to ''virtues'' such as repentance or humility for those not living 
under the guidance of reason. Thus they are dictated by reason for those who are not themselves capable of full 
rationality.97
So despite Spinoza's rejection of traditional prescriptive virtues, like humility and repentance (EIVp53, 
54),  as  insufficient  and  not  good  in  themselves,  he  does  not  dismiss  them completely.  They  can 
sometimes be necessary, he says: 
As men seldom live according to the dictates of reason, these two emotions, humility and repentance, and also 
hope and fear, bring more advantage than harm; and thus, if sin we must, it's better to sin in their direction. For if  
men of weak spirit  should all equally be subjected to pride, and should be ashamed of nothing and afraid of  
nothing,  by what  bonds  could  they be held  together  and  bound? The mob is  fearsome,  if  it  does  not  fear  
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(EIVp54s).
And in the same scholium Spinoza goes on to say that the people subject to these emotions are far more 
readily induced than others to live by the guidance of reason in the end, and become free men and enjoy 
the life of the blessed. But  true virtue,  according to  Spinoza, is self-contentment that arise from the 
activity of reason, and that self-contentment that arise from this reason is the highest there can be:
Now man's true power of activity, or his virtue, is reason itself (pr.3,III), which man regards clearly and distinctly 
(prs. 40&43,II). Therefore self-contentment arises from reason. Again, in contemplating himself a man perceives 
clearly and distinctly, that is, adequately, only what follows from  his power of activity (Def.2,III), that is, (pr.3III) 
what follows from his power of understanding. So the greatest self-contentment there can be arises from this  
contemplation.
Scholium: In fact self-contentment is the highest good we can hope for (EIVp52).
All people strive, but when we strive according to reason, we strive only to understand (EIVp26), and 
the mind's highest virtue is to know God (EIVp28). This highest goal we ought to strive for, what sort 
of ethical implications does Spinoza think it will have? Only things that follow from our nature, he says, 
and these things are necessarily in agreement with the nature of, and thus beneficial to all men: Insofar a 
thing is in agreement with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good (EIVp31), and the more a 
thing is in agreement with our nature, the more advantageous it is to us. If I live healthy my reward is 
health. If  I eat poison, the punishment is illness. Spinoza describes the conditions under which we can 
live well and wisely. This living well or poorly, however, is not an external judgement given at the end  
of life,  it  is the causally necessary effect  of  one's actions.98 Further,  the things that  agree with our 
nature,  which we can enjoy as we live virtuous,  is something that  is common to  all,  Spinoza says 
(EIVp36), and when we live according to true virtue, it is ''contagious'': we will desire it for rest of 
mankind (EIVp37). 
The aspect of happiness is important for Spinoza. When we are virtuous in his sense, we move from the 
provisional virtue of doing the right thing because we ought to, or because it is commanded to us by an 
external force,  to  doing the right  thing because  when we live according to  reason and our  nature  
compels us, there is a change in motivation - from doing something good indirectly, out of e.g. fear - to 
doing something good because we cannot do otherwise; there is a necessary desire to do good because 
not doing it would be in opposition to our nature:
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This corollary can be illustrated by the example of the sick man and the healthy man. The sick man eats what he 
dislikes through fear of death. The healthy man takes pleasure in his food and thus enjoys a better life than if he 
were to fear death and directly seek to avoid it (EIVp63s). 
We can se that Spinoza is interested not mainly in how we ought to live but how we might99 live. We 
interact with each other and the planet in a myriad of different ways, and we might inflict harm on 
ourselves, others and the environment, live in fear and bondage, be envious and destructive, or we might 
live free from emotional bondage, striving to understand what is to our common advantage, and see that 
we have nothing to gain in preventing others from achieving the same thing. The shift from ought to 
might show the descriptive nature of Spinoza rather than a prescriptive one, but we can ask the same 
question here as we did above about ought: does not every might imply can in the same way as ought 
does? Yes it  does,  but  Spinoza is not  trying to  fit  human behaviour  into  a  square box of fatalistic 
inactivity.  Spinoza is exploring the limits of what we might and can do to flourish, not what we ought 
do do according to a set of rules. Even though both ought and might imply can, they have different  
connotations and we need to be sensitive towards these. I will briefly return to how might is compatible 
with necessitarianism in §10.
Striving towards knowledge pertains to the mind’s true nature. Striving toward fulfilling ones nature is 
gaining power. Power leads to physical and mental vigour. This makes us able to be adequate causes and 
actors. When we are adequate causes we can determine ourselves. When we determine ourselves we are 
free. When we break free from bondage we gain self-subsistence. When we are self-subsistent we act 
according to our nature, we become ourselves. This is all aspects of the same thing, and Spinoza called  
it virtue. But as we have seen, virtue, ethics and freedom is living according to ones nature, and this is 
self-subsistence. There is no beginning and end in Spinoza's ethics, we just have to break in somewhere 
and see that the whole and the parts are all related to each other. When spinoza chose to write the 
Ethics in a strict geometrical manner, his intentions was probably far less ''fleeting'' than this suggestion.  
However, I think it applies, and it is one of the aspects that makes the  Ethics  so interesting to work 
with. 
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§9: Goals and striving – Conatus
The Latin word Conatus means effort, endeavour, inclination, impulse or striving. It denotes the effort 
or striving of natural impulses, our appetite for staying into existence. Spinoza uses the term to describe 
how all things have an innate tendency to persist in their own being. It is closely related to how living 
ethical for Spinoza is, as I have shown, self-subsistence. Striving towards activity of mind and body is 
the path of the virtuous.  In this section I  will show how Spinoza denies teleology, but  emphasises 
striving. I will also show how Spinoza in his rejection of free will, puts conatus in as a substitute, and to 
what degree we can determine our strivings and be self-determined.
First, I want to note the terms Spinoza use when he talks about striving. The overarching concept is 
appetite  [appetitus]. When he talks about the striving of the mind, or psychological manifestations of 
striving,  our  wanting – the will –  he uses  voluntas.  When he refers to  the bodily impulses he use 
conatus.
EIIIp9 is an illustrative proposition:
The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, endeavours to persist  
in its own being over an indefinite period of time, and it is conscious of this conatus.
Scholium: When this conatus is related to the mind alone, it is called will [voluntas]; when it is related to mind 
and body together, it is called appetite [appetitus], which is therefore nothing else but man's essence, from the 
nature of which  there  necessarily follow those things that  tend  to his  preservation,  and  which  man  is  thus  
determined to perform. […] ''Desire [cupiditas] is appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof.'' It is clear 
from the above considerations that we do not endeavour, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be 
good. On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavour will, seek after and desire it.
With striving Spinoza explain human beings as an integrated part of nature. Everything that exists strives 
to  preserve its existence.  In the process Spinoza replaces the notion of free will and ''independent'' 
intentions with necessary striving by conatus, towards what we consequentially judge to be good. This 
shows how Spinoza rejects a teleological explanation, the notion that we are goal oriented and strives 
towards something because we initially judge it to  be good. This is first  and foremost an attack on 
divine purpose, the idea that God acts with a goal in mind: e.g. rewarding the good and punishing the 
wicked, or creating the world in a specific manner as to satisfy human needs. This is, as we have seen, 
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impossibility within Spinoza's system, and it necessarily follows that it is impossibility for humans as well 
as for  God.  The eternal necessity of nature Spinoza seeks to  establish is his strict  cause-and-effect  
determinism. Allowing teleology or  final causes would contribute to  turn this picture upside down, 
indicating that effects are not the results of causes, but that causes are effects, like Spinoza exemplifies 
in the appendix to EI, if a stone falls from the roof on somebody's head and kills him, by this method of  
arguing they will prove that the stone fell in order to kill the man. That is; that the stone fell to kill the 
man instead of the man being killed because he was hit by a stone in the head. Spinoza links the belief in 
divine freedom with men's belief that they are free, and this belief he links to teleology. If final causes are 
rivals of efficient ones, teleology involves radical freedom and threatens to falsify determinism. 
Turning nature upside down is for Spinoza to explain one event in terms of subsequent ones. But, as 
Bennett  remarks,  often there  is only one  event  where  the  thought  of  the  'final cause'  functions  as 
'efficient cause':
In saying 'He raised his hand so as to deflect the stone' we are saying that Raise happened because he thought it  
would cause the stone's being deflected. What is there in that for Spinoza to object to? 100
It makes perfectly good sense, and Spinoza himself explain actions by reference to the agent's thoughts 
about the future. I will not dig deeper into the inconsistencies here, but rather focus on how Spinoza 
substitutes teleology and final causes with his non-teleological concept of striving or appetite.
According to Spinoza the decisions of the mind are nothing but appetites:  ...mental decision on one  
hand, and the appetite and physical state of the body on the other hand… are one and the same thing  
(EIIIp2s). We have seen that appetite for Spinoza is the very essence of man, the things he does to 
promote his preservation. This urge for survival is ever-present and can be driven by both clear and 
confused ideas.  This condition of striving is already set,  and is the only one we are moving from. 
Bennett quotes Roth:
Human beings …, like everything else and in spite of the fact of self-consciousness, work out  from conditions  
which are already set, not towards ideals, which are to be realised. In the words of the decisive 4d7: 'By the end 
for the sake of which we do anything I understand appetite.' What is appetite? Blind impulse. We follow ends and 
ideals, but these ends and ideals are projected from behind us.101
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With regard to 'blind impulse' it is important to note that Spinoza says that we are often conscious of our  
appetites, but not where they are coming from, their causes (and that is why we think the wanting is a 
free act of will). Our will is by this just the minds strivings, not disconnected from the intellect, but the 
very same thing: Will and intellect are one and the same thing (EIIp49cor). We believe ourselves free, 
because we are not aware of the necessary force of our appetites and antecedent causes. I asked in §2 if 
knowledge and acceptance of causes can change the turn of one’s willing. With the background we now 
have, I  feel able to  conjecture that  yes, this is possible. Spinoza's determinism is necessary, but not 
fatalistic or pre-established. Our strivings are necessary, but we can to some degree determine in what 
direction we strive. When we are being active in respect to our emotions and elevate to freedom, in 
Spinoza’s sense, we start striving towards  other things than we do when we are in bondage. Without 
mindless anger, envy, hate, despair, hope, fear &c, clouding our sub species aeternitatis, Spinoza holds 
that we strive towards things that will make us self-subsistent or self-contained, as explained above. 
When we act according to reason, the good things that we strive towards for ourselves, we will also 
want for other people. So the power of virtue is not a freedom that limits other people’s freedom, it is 
supposed to enhance it. To be self-subsistent is more than mere self-preservation, it include a higher 
form  of  striving  that  Spinoza  associates  with  virtue:  the  striving  for  perfection,  for  whole-ness, 
completeness: it implies to strive for higher levels of being in oneself.102 The highest level is for Spinoza 
to  live under the guidance of reason (EIVp35). If we are ignorant, our mind will strive for random 
wantings and people will often conflict with each other. When our mind is filled with adequate ideas, our 
striving will differ from that of the ignorant; hence, the willings turn out to be different. Seeing that this 
is a process, we can say that our priorities change over time, if we are so fortunate as to get wiser. 
§10: What about Virtue?
It is probably pretty clear now, but I repeat: True virtue is nothing other than to live by the guidance of 
reason, according to Spinoza (EIVp37s); and blessedness is not a reward of virtue, but virtue itself, by 
EVp42. This can be objected to,  and it was also (maybe especially) difficult to  accept for Spinoza's 
contemporaries. What is being virtuous? What ought we do? I have already mentioned that for Spinoza 
the question is not so much how we ought to live as how we might live. But it is obvious that Spinoza 
advocates one path, the path of wisdom/virtue, and not the one of ignorance. Spinoza describes the 
different ways of life, and it is as if he is saying that we might chose the path of ignorance, or we might 
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chose the path of wisdom, but we ought to chose the path of wisdom. 
I have already discussed the ethical field a bit, and as we know it consists of a vide spectre of theories,  
including utilitarian ethics, deontology and virtue ethics as well as meta-ethical theories such as moral 
realism. Many of the models of moral theory are based upon some sort of imperative of what we ought 
to do. Normative ethics concerns how we ought to act, morally speaking and examines the rightness and 
wrongness of actions. Meta-ethics attempts among other things to explore what ''good'' and ''bad'' stands 
for.  Spinoza  claims  that  nothing  is  certainly  good  or  evil  except  what  is  really  conducive  to 
understanding or what can hinder understanding (EIVp27).
The problem is obviously there. Pursuing an ethics that induce us to  follow our nature seems to spell 
catastrophe. Kant observed rightly the  unsocial sociability103 of men, which denotes our tendency to 
come together in society, coupled with our tendency to resist and break society up. History shows that 
we have killed each other for centuries, and we keep killing each other with increasing efficiency. How 
can Spinoza's descriptive ethics help us?
Spinoza postulates 'good and 'bad' as something that is respectively in agreement (EIVp31) or contrary 
to our nature (EIV30), but nothing in themselves:
As for the terms ''god'' and''bad'', they likewise indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves, and 
are nothing but modes of thinking, or notions, which we form from comparing things with one another (EIV 
preface).
No action is good or bad in itself; it is only a matter of how it affects us and how we evaluate something. 
Some properties can be considered good in a spider, and bad in a human, according to the respective 
natures. And the ''goodness'' or ''badness'' of these properties are measured in more reality or less reality. 
The thing a spider does to realize its nature, the spider's virtue, is not the same as a human's virtue. 
When the spider kills and eats its mate, it is good, when a human does the same it is bad, because it does 
not  pertain to  human nature  or  essence.  And as  we have  seen,  virtue,  perfection  or  reality  is  the 
fulfilment of a things nature or essence. In the big picture, an act can be good in one situation and bad in 
another,  and neither  in a  third  situation.  Spinoza has  little  to  spare for  the ''common man's''  value 
judgements, of universal ''goods'' and ''bads'', but nevertheless Spinoza assumes a liberal belief in human 
nature that involves – given that all were to follow their true nature as rational beings – a view that the 
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good which each man who pursues virtue aims at for himself he will also desire for the rest of mankind 
(EIVp37). This means that according to Spinoza, the reason why people act so horrible towards each 
other time and time again is ignorance, they are not virtuous in the sense that they act according to their 
nature, which is constituted by reason. As I said above, we might live according to reason, and the  
dictates of reason. This sounds somewhat prescriptive, but in EIVp18s where Spinoza announces his 
plan to show what reason prescribes us, he does not follow up104, and we are left with descriptions. But 
it does not matter, because we have enough material to answer the question of whether there are any 
oughts, or if we have to confine ourselves to is. 
I think the only imperative ought in spinozistic philosophy is that we ought to follow our true nature. As 
I showed above at the end of §8, this is a circular mass of concepts. We ought to be virtuous, we ought 
to be powerful, we ought to free ourselves from the bondage of passive emotions, we ought to live fully 
regardless of duration, we ought to be self-subsistent. We ought to love God, we ought to honour the 
necessary laws of nature, we ought to strive for salvation... We could keep going, but I think that for 
Spinoza this would really just be different ways of telling us one thing, that we ought to be free. 
Every ought imply can, and we are back at how we might live. We might live according to reason, or we 
might live in ignorance. Reason gives us sustainable pleasure, and ignorance gives us pain, or at best 
unsustainable pleasure. As I said in the beginning of this chapter, the primary ethical problem for Spinoza 
is that  we are in bondage. But  we might live otherwise, we can, and we ought  to,  for the sake of  
everybody's freedom and peacefulness.  Regarding necessitarianism and the different  connotations of 
ought and might, I will say something about why there is more informative to talk about how we might 
live as opposed to how we ought to live. I think that in speaking of what we might or might not do, we 
are closer and more sensitive towards the descriptive notion of necessity and cause-effect.  How we 
might live can be seen as purely descriptive. We might live in one way or another because we can (and 
what we can or are able to are dependent on a chain of prior causes and conditions), but it is no inherent 
moral  claim; whereas  ought or  should are  used  in  more  general  to  refer  to  obligation  or  duty 
independent of prior causes. The best alternative is, I think, to first consider what we possibly can, i.e. 
what we might do, and if we can do something, to  then speak of whether or not we ought to do it. I 
therefore generally find  might  as more compatible with necessitarianism, but as we have seen, after 
finding out how we might live, there are some things within these limits we ought to do.
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In this chapter I have discussed Spinoza's concept of ethics and freedom and argued that we indeed have 
the opportunity to be actors, even in a determined universe. The next and final chapter will mainly be a 
summary of the mainlines of what have been discussed this far, and I will conclude by showing that even 
though much of Spinoza's philosophy is abstract and difficult to grasp at first, his ethics culminate in an 
inspiring practical philosophy. 
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Chapter Four: Practical Philosophy
By now it is clear that  within Spinoza's system we are always brought back to  his core ideas. The 
identification of God with nature and nature's necessity leads way to the necessary determined nature of 
all things, including the human mind. Since the human mind is a part of all necessary things, it is likewise 
causally determined. When we understand the connections and necessity of all things we understand that 
there is no radical free will, immune to causal necessity. When we understand that there is no radical free 
will, we see that our appetites are what drive us. When we see the necessity of this, we get adequate 
knowledge and power to determine our striving in the direction of understanding. This power is what  
true virtue is, according to Spinoza. When we are virtuous we act according to reason. When we act 
according to reason we act according to our nature. When we act fully with reason we have knowledge 
of God. God is nature. Nature is necessary. 
I started this thesis with modal metaphysics and substance monism, and went via the parallelism thesis,  
to  show the ethical endpoint.  But I  could just  as well have started with the ethics and shown how 
Spinoza pulls the abstract metaphysics and parallelism out  from his practical philosophy. This is the 
nature of Spinoza's system, which makes it both particularly intriguing and difficult at the same time. It 
is a myriad of threads that need to be sorted. As I said in last chapter, even though it is not completely in 
harmony with Spinoza's  geometrical method,  there  is  no  beginning and end,  we just  have to  start  
somewhere and dig in, untie the sometimes messy, knot carefully, move back and forth, and see how it 
all belongs together.  How interpreters have solved the various problems arising from unclaritities in 
Spinoza's philosophy has resulted in different interpretations, as we have seen. But we know one thing, 
that seeing the things under the light of eternity, the big picture, is important for Spinoza. Not focussing 
on particular 'right' or 'wrong' acts, or a myriad of do's and dont's, the resulting attitude becomes more  
holistic;  a  way of  living,  relevant  for  all  areas  of  life  and  affairs.  When  everything  is  necessarily 
connected, we cannot see our actions merely as isolated cases, we have to see them as part of the big  
picture. In this last chapter I will show that Spinoza's philosophy is not merely abstract propositions, but  
something that  can be applied in practical areas  as  well.  I  will only offer  some final pointers,  but 
hopefully they will still succeed in showing the depth of Spinoza's philosophy.
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§11: Freedom and Necessity in the state
We have seen that freedom consists in building up power to act, and bondage consists in diminishing it. 
The order of causes is composition and decomposition. Some causes empower, and some tear apart. 
Ultimately this affects all of nature, and for humans, as a mode of nature, our relation to the causes  
affects us.  The relation Spinoza wants us to  have,  is the one of understanding all necessity and act 
accordingly, because as we have seen, that means, for Spinoza, that the emotions that follow will not be 
passions. In Spinoza's political writings he transfers this principle to  society. How we relate to  one 
another in society can make us stronger or weaker. In the Political Treatise Spinoza say that men seek 
from their nature to join forces, because then they have consequently more power, or right, than either  
one alone; and the greater the number of the union are, the more right they will together possess (PTII, 
13). However, as he continues to say in PTII, 14, if men are assailed by anger, envy or any emotion 
deriving from hatred, they are drawn apart and are contrary to one another. But this decomposition of  
cooperation is destructive and renders them with less rights or  power.  Since reason dictates power, 
disembodiment  of society is contrary to  reason.  Reason can do much to  control and moderate  the 
passions. When we are free from irrational passions, we are supposed by Spinoza to act according to all 
men's interest. It is surely better to have a reasonable minister of war than one led by ignorance and 
passions, but Spinoza says that it does not really matter what the motives that induce men to administer  
a state's affairs properly are, as long as they in fact are administered properly.  Freedom of spirit or  
strength of mind is the virtue of a private citizen: the virtue of a state is its security (PTI, 6). However, 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  a  minister's  virtue  of  reason  induces  proper  administration  and 
preservation of common interests more than ignorance does.
Spinoza denounces three ways of standing in relation to nature's necessity: the slave, the tyrant and the 
priest. The slave is victim to sad passions, the tyrant exploits this man and thrives, gaining power on 
behalf of the slave, and the priest who is saddened by the human condition in general.105 If the state is 
governed by ignorant tyrants, they gain power on behalf of the enslaved masses, and will do everything 
to keep them surpressed in fear and superstition.106 Spinoza is uncompromising in his postulation of the 
mutual disadvantages of tyranny:
Granted, then, that the supreme mystery of despotism, its prop and stay, is to keep men in a state of deception, 
and with the specious title of religion to cloak the fear by which they must be held in check, so that they will fight  
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for their servitude as if for salvation, and count it no shame, but the highest of honour, to spend their blood and 
their lives for the glorification of one man. Yet no more disastrous policy can be devised or attempted in a free 
commonwealth.  To  invest  with  prejudice  or  in  any  way coerce  the  citizen's  free  judgement  is  altogether  
incompatible with the freedom of the people (TTP preface).  
In the same place Spinoza goes on to say that his main task with the Theological-Political Treatise is to 
demonstrate  that  freedom  can  be  granted  without  endangering  piety  and  the  peace  of  the 
commonwealth, and also that the peace of the commonwealth and piety depends on this freedom. We 
can see how. Masses suppressed by fear can never reach the blessedness and freedom Spinoza is talking 
about. At best they can be obedient. But if they are suppressed long enough, at some point or another 
they will start to revolt, and this will cause unstable conditions in the state, leading to loss of security.
Obedience to the law may sometimes be necessary, but that is not Spinoza's main issue. The problem is 
that  law, whether moral or  social does not  alone provide us with knowledge.  As in the worst  case 
scenario of the tyrant, the formation of knowledge is prevented. The free commonwealth Spinoza is 
describing as most perfect is one where the citizens are free and the state facilitates for knowledge and 
makes it possible for all. If all men were free in Spinoza's sense, it would be a consensus among people 
that  it  is  of  every  ones  interest  to  keep  stability  and  peace,  in society,  both  locally and  globally. 
Knowledge and understanding is essential for Spinoza because it is the immanent power to discriminate 
between modes of existence, the way of wisdom agrees with our nature and leads to peace, pleasure and 
life, the way of ignorance leads to strife, decomposition, unpleasure and death:
There is then, a philosophy of ''life'' in Spinoza; it consists precisely in denouncing all that separates us from life, 
all these transcendent values that  are turned against life, these values that  are tied up to the conditions and  
illusions of consciousness. Life is poisoned by the categories of Good and Evil, of blame and merit, of sin and 
redemption. What poisons life is hatred, including the hatred that is turned back against oneself in the form of 
guilt.107
When human beings are interacting with other things, the different interactions can enhance, destroy or 
make  no  difference  to  their  nature.  In  the  same way,  but  greater  in scale  and  complexity,  this  is 
applicable to a state. Like the virtue of humans is to seek out the things that enhance them, the virtue of  
the state is to  seek out  the things that  enhance it.  And as quoted above, for Spinoza this virtue is 
security. Spinoza was a social contract theorist, but he differed from Hobbes (whom Spinoza had read) 
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in the motivation of why we form a society: the reason why we seek together in society for Hobbes was 
fear. Fear of a life in the state of nature that according to him was ''solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short''. Out of fear for my life I give up all my natural rights to an absolute sovereign. Fear is as we 
know an emotion of unpleasure and bondage according to Spinoza, fear is the same as losing power, and 
a state should be based on the understanding that together we gain power. It is only when we understand 
our nature and parts that we can seek out exactly that which agrees with it, and not do what fear drives  
us to. But even if a society is built upon understanding, it can still be overpowered:
...although the constitutions set forth above may have the support of reason and the common sentiment of men, 
there  are  times  when  they can  nevertheless  be overthrown,  for  there  is  no  emotion  that  is  not  sometimes  
overpowered by a stronger contrary emotion. We often see the fear of death, for instance, overpowered by greed 
for another's property. […] So however well a commonwealth is organized and however good its constitution, yet 
when the state is in the grip of some crisis and everyone, as commonly happens, is seized with a kind of panic, 
they all pursue a course prompted only by their immediate fears with no regard for the future of the laws; all turn 
to the man who is renowned for his victories, they set him free from the laws, they extend his command – a very 
bad precedent – and and entrust the entire commonwealth to his good faith (PTX,10).108  
Spinoza's objection to this is that in a properly organized commonwealth of the sort he describes as 
ideal,  such panic does not occur without good reason; and so this panic and the resulting confusion  
cannot be assigned to any cause that could have been avoided by human foresight (PTX, 10), and he as 
argued for division of power (PTVIII, 25), so that one man or a small elite cannot gain too much power 
and take advantage of it in a state of crisis. Spinoza is therefore confident that peace and conservation of 
law and order remain safe from disintegration from internal causes. But as with everything else, it can be 
overpowered by external causes, like a more powerful state, seeking to expand.  
§12: Environmental implications
For obvious reasons Spinoza is not tending to environmental subjects like global warming, deforestation, 
factory farms, endangered species or  other problems with the ecological balance.  These are modern 
issues that  despite his insights, Spinoza could not have had many, if any, opinions of. It  seems like 
modern science sometimes moves more rapidly than our understanding of the consequences. However, 
Spinoza does as we know speak of the ethical problems of viewing humans as a ''kingdom within a 
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kingdom''. In the most extreme case of the view of a kingdom within a kingdom, the result is treating 
human action as something separately from, and independent of nature. To grasp this better we have to 
take a quick look at Spinoza's causal necessity and theory of knowledge again. As have been said, the 
notion that  there is only one substance existing with absolute  necessity,  and infinitely many modes, 
existing with relative necessity, suggests that  it  is impossible for Spinoza to  define a mode without 
relation to its environment. 
The environment a given individual inhabit is consisting of other modes. Different finite modes exist with 
causal necessity, but as we have seen, existence is not belonging to their essence; only substance has 
existence as essence. Every finite mode, humans, animals, artefacts, &c, is nothing but: 
a  temporary coagulation  of materials  drawn  from the  environment  in  a  particular  ratio.  This  ratio,  which  
determines what is poisonous and what is healthful, what is predator and what is prey, cannot be determined  
outside of the very specificity of the environment.109 
It is like the way Spinoza sees value judgements like ''good'' and ''evil''; the terms do not have any real  
value if we see them as disconnected to what they describe. The same way, what is good or bad, or 
healthful or poisonous are determined by the nature of a given individual. Living in Sahara is bad for a 
polar bear. Living in fear in a war zone is bad for a human. Both cases inhibit the individual from living 
according to its true nature. This is causally necessary; the polar bear is not evolved to maximize its 
potential in Sahara and will die. And as we have seen, living in fear and danger is not beneficial for 
humans either, and the poor circumstances will causally render the human powerless, as opposed to  
what would happen if it got the opportunity to live in a more beneficial environment.
Assumed that everything necessarily has some effect, one cannot expect to intervene in anything without 
it having consequences for the environment or us. Sometimes we intervene to  acquire some desired 
effect; sometimes we are unaware of or close our eyes for the results. Sometimes they are neither good 
nor bad for our nature, sometimes they are disastrous.  Seeing the whole and the parts as necessary 
linked together is an important aspect of Spinoza's third kind of knowledge. When we are able to see  
individual things as built up from different parts in a more or less complex way, constituting a particular 
nature,  and  at  the  same time see  the  different  singular  things  as  part  in its  local  environment,  an 
environment constituted by numerous different individual things that affects and are being affected in this 
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milieu,  and  see how this local environment  is a part  of,  affects  and are affected in a bigger  global 
environment, and so on, we understand things as necessary under the light of eternity.
 
§13: Psychoterapy
I have already given an account for the emotions and their role in Spinoza's ethics, but want to say a few 
more words on the happiness aspect. Spinoza aims to show that virtue is its own reward:
Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. We do not enjoy blessedness because we keep our lusts in 
check. On the contrary, it is because we enjoy blessedness that we are able to keep our lusts in check (EVp42). 
What is in my power to do increases by living virtuous. Since my mind and my will, or strivings, are the 
same, this is not our purely by choice, but it is a consequence of the infinite effects I am subject to. As I 
have shown, we can to some degree strive in the direction of reason and understanding. This is closely 
related to a deep understanding of what is useful to our nature and environment:
The foundational question of Stoic psychotherapy is 'what is in my power to do?' The Stoics determine that the 
passions, i.e. irrational judgements, alone are in our power to manipulate, and consequently, they conclude that 
therapy involves their manipulation. Spinoza indicates that he is motivated by a similar question and insight. He 
says that 'it is necessary to know the power of our nature and its lack of power so we can determine what reason 
can and cannot do in controlling the emotions' (EIVp17). Therapy begins with discerning what is in my power to 
do, which presupposes no small knowledge. Accordingly, Spinoza begins his Ethics by presenting metaphysics, a 
physics and anthropology, emulating the unity of the Stoic system: I can adequately discern and evaluate my  
capabilities only by knowing nature as a whole. Once I apprehend that all things in nature are determined, I will 
recognize that the therapy of the passions is in my power.110
Of course,  as  I  remarked  in §8,  Spinoza  differs  from the  Stoics  in respect  of  how our  power  to 
manipulate and determine ourselves take form. The direction our willings take are made up by a long 
line of antecedent causes and effects determined by various factors of genetic make-up, environment, 
different  encounters  and more.  We do  not  decide to  change our  ways or  beliefs  from a  free  will 
disconnected from these factors, but our minds are made up by, and are identical to the totality of our 
knowledge and experiences.  We will always strive after  pleasure and avoid unpleasure.  This applies 
whether we have adequate knowledge of things or not. The only difference is that if we have adequate  
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knowledge we will strive towards more ''sustainable'' pleasures. It can be very pleasurable to eat candy 
for breakfast every day and avoid eating fish and vegetables. But in the long run this is poisonous and 
leads to disease. Most parents tell their children this, to more or less avail, but true knowledge of the 
case are not arrived at by being obedient while secretly hating healthy fool and craving candy; it is when 
you instinctively crave what is improving your body and mind's health and vitality it is an action of 
yours, and not a passion. If we are lacking knowledge we will spend much time and effort to strive after 
perishable goods. It is a theme through the Ethics, and was also Spinoza's concern in his earliest piece of 
writing, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, here from its opening lines:
After experience had taught me the hollowness and futility of everything that is ordinarily encountered in daily 
life, and I realised that all things which were the source and object of my anxiety held nothing of good or evil in 
themselves save insofar as the mind was influenced by them, I resolved at length to enquire whether there existed 
a true good, one which was capable of communicating itself and could alone affect the mind to the exclusion of all  
else, whether, in fact, there was something whose discovery and acquisition  would afford me a continuous and 
supreme joy to eternity.
Therapy is often about articulating confused ideas, exploring them, and understanding how they arrived 
to ones mind in the first place. Understanding that we did not do this or that because we chose to, but  
because the series of determined effects led us to,  can be enlightening and liberating. You have not 
single-handedly built your mind. And in moments when we try to do so, for example in therapy or by 
trying to  follow Spinoza's advise, the only tools at our disposal are the ones that we have inherited 
causally from moments past. If we do not see this we are going to repeat pasts mistakes. Spinoza is 
trying to show us that every time we understand the connection and causes of something we gain a new 
tool. And as we know, for Spinoza the mind (and its tools) and the will is the same thing. We are what  
we are, but we can get more familiar with why we are as we are, and this may change our striving in the 
future.  This is no free will, this is purely striving.  Einstein,  who was a great  admirer of Spinoza111, 
following Schopenhauer, puts it nicely: 
Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they talk about the freedom of the human will. I have a 
feeling, for instance, that I will something or other, but what relation this has to freedom I cannot understand at 
all. I feel that I will to light my pipe and I do it; but how can I connect this up with the idea of freedom? What is 
behind the act of willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing? Schopenhauer once said: Der Mensch kann was 
er will; er kann aber nicht wollen was er will.112
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Our reasons for doing things are merely what we will. Davidson says that when we answer the question 
'Why did you do it?' with 'For no reason', this means not that there is no reason, but that there is no 
further reason, besides wanting to do it.113 Understanding as far as we can why we want and will as we 
do, does not have to make us fatalistic. On the contrary, if Spinoza is right it will increase our freedom. 
Our neuroses, hopes and fears will seem less personal and insufferable. We understand that input effects 
output, becoming sensitive to the background causes of one's thoughts and feelings can allow for greater  
control over one's life:
It is one thing to bicker with your wife because you are in a bad mood; it is another to realize that your mood and 
behaviour have been caused by low blood sugar. This understanding reveals you to be a biochemical puppet, of 
course, but it also allows you to grab hold of one of your strings: A bite of food may be all that your personality 
requires. Getting behind our conscious thoughts and feelings can allow us to steer a more intelligent course  
through our lives.114
This is a simple, down to earth account of what we can hope for in getting knowledge about causes. I  
have not discussed, and will not further pretend to  address the later propositions of EV, concerning 
intuitive knowledge and eternity of the mind and intellectual knowledge of God.115 I have not, by far, 
said all I wanted to say or addressed all that needs to be discussed. But within my limits I feel it is 
necessary to stop here. In the last section I will simply recapitulate a bit with a few fairly predicable 
words.
§14: True Freedom
The practical implications  of  Spinoza’s  philosophy are  that  it  tells  us  how we  might live.  We  can 
determine ourselves  to  live according to  reason and follow wisdom rather  than  ignorance.  This  is 
conditional and causal rather than imperative. If we live according to wisdom the result will be pleasure. 
If we live according to ignorance the result will be unpleasure. The only ought we get from this is that 
we ought to follow the path of wisdom, to be ourselves. Spinoza's radical freedom does not lie in free 
will, but in how understanding causes and effects gives us more power over our emotions than we 
would have had in ignorance. The latter has also shown to be scientifically supported, even if we do not  
accept Spinoza's metaphysical framework or parallelism doctrine.116 
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Of course, many of Spinoza's arguments do not hold. Interpreters have tried and tried again to make 
sense of them, occasionally bending the original texts liberally. In many instances, the problem is not 
only to figure out if Spinoza's conclusions follow from his premises, but what he is saying in the first 
place.  But that  is less important  than one might think,  because it is still a worthwhile philosophical 
project:
Throughout the Ethics... we have been tracking and criticising Spinoza as he has tackled profoundly important 
questions, some of them discovered by him, and even when he has been immersed in errors, we have been able to 
see why.117
Spinoza  takes  his  metaphysical claims and applies  them to  human ways of  living,  arguing for  e.g. 
people's need for each other in metaphysical form, deducing it from general principles concerning the 
necessary relation between all finite modes. The starting point is that no individual finite mode whose 
nature is different from our own can help or hinder us in any way, i.e., they cannot enter into causal 
relation with us. Thus they are not good or  bad for us,  because they cannot  affect  us positively or 
negatively. On the other hand, things with which we do have something in common can either agree or 
disagree with our nature. Hence they can either increase or diminish our power to act. Something is 
harmful to  the  extent  that  its  nature  disagrees  with,  or  is  contrary to,  our  own nature  (EIVp30): 
Presumably, this applies to things whose efforts to preserve their own being conflicts with our efforts to  
preserve our own being.118 And vice versa, something is good when it is good for us, when the other 
things effort to  preserve their being is compatible or in harmony with ours. Those things are always 
good, according to Spinoza (EIVp31). This goes as we have seen further than poisonous and nutritious 
foods; it  applies to  social and environmental relationships as well.  Since we are always striving to 
preserve our being, different things can either help or hinder us in realizing our potential power. Spinoza 
means he has clearly demonstrated that humans necessarily follow their desires, and they desire to feel 
pleasure. When they consider reason as the highest pleasure, they live in harmony with each other they 
are mutual useful to realize each other’s power. When they follow the passions they are contrary to each 
other, and will be in conflict. We obviously have to recognize that there are limits to this ethical model of  
Spinoza’s. I have already discussed a few of them in §8. His therapeutical methods offers not fireproof 
solutions, even though he often seems pretty sure of his techniques (but concludes with saying that true  
freedom is as difficult as it is rare) as something eternally, necessary ontologically true. Be that what it 
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may, we in can in any case see them as guidelines, sort of like Habermas' discourse ethics. We cannot 
escape desire, but we can, as far as we know, desire rationally.
Wolfson is right to assume that  Spinoza's axiomatic style of presentation does not in fact provide the clarity  
Spinoza intended.  The  definitions  are  typically  obscure,  the  axioms  frequently  not  evident,  and  the  
demonstrations all to often unconvincing. And yet it is hard to escape the feeling that there is something there  
worth taking pains to try to understand, something very important, if true, and something quite possibly true.119 
I think like Wolfson that Spinoza has a great deal of important insights to offer us, and as I have argued, 
his moderate necessitarianism shows us that there is still room for ways we might live, that we in fact 
can steer ourselves in one direction rather than another, and that when we truly understands something it 
becomes a necessary part of what we want to do. In that way we can make free humans of ourselves, 
and this is compatible with a necessary determined world.
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